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Time for a New Tech-Centric Church-Pike: 
Historical Lessons from Intelligence Oversight 
Could Help Congress Tackle Today’s Data-Driven 
Technologies 
APRIL FALCON DOSS*©  
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s, Congress undertook a significant restructuring of its approach to 
overseeing surveillance carried out by the U.S. intelligence community.  A series of 
scandals, combined with accidental revelations and public concern, led leaders in 
the United States House and Senate to recognize that the existing Congressional 
committees were not well situated to make policy assessments, carry out oversight, 
or draft and propose new legislation relating to surveillance activities by the United 
States.  Some of the gaps Congress experienced were created by emerging 
technologies.  Many of the gaps related to more prosaic issues of turf: which 
committees controlled which budgets, which committees had members with an 
inherent interest in particular topics, and which topics had generated congressional 
oversight in the past.  But Congress was also attempting to grapple with what had 
been revealed as a sprawling challenge: how to ensure Congress had visibility into 
the vast scope of governmental intelligence activities, and how to appropriately 
constrain those activities in order to balance the necessary and appropriate 
interests in national security with the protection of the rights and liberties vital to a 
functioning democracy.  When Congress passed the resolutions forming the two 
committees that would take up this challenge, Congress recognized that existing 
committees simply did not have the breadth of jurisdiction, depth of staff, or other 
practical resources required in order to effectively tackled such a complex and 
sprawling challenge.1   
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 1. The House of Representatives passed H.R. Res. 591, which “Established in the House of Representatives 
a Select Committee on Intelligence to conduct an inquiry into the organization, operations, and oversight of the 
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Those two committees, informally referred to as the Church and Pike 
Committees after their respective chairmen in the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives, focused on activities of the executive branch of government.  
Notwithstanding the specific focus of those historical committees, there are useful 
parallels between the challenges faced by Congress prior to establishing the Church 
and Pike committees and the challenges faced by Congress in dealing with data-
driven technologies today. Given the complexity of issues prompted by current 
technology developments,  it is unlikely that any single solution will be sufficient to 
effectively and comprehensively resolve the full scope of legal and policy questions 
that need to be addressed in the data-intensive world in which we all live.  
Nonetheless, establishing special bipartisan committees in both houses of 
Congress, committees whose jurisdiction is designed to cut across existing 
committee lines and encompass a wide scope of issues arising from the impact on 
individuals and society of data-driven technologies, could be one important tool in 
supporting the ability of American law and policy to keep pace with the rapid rate 
of technological change. 
At first blush, these committees might seem like an odd comparison.  After all, 
the intelligence committees were established to oversee executive branch activity, 
not to delve into the widespread array of knotty legal and policy questions that arise 
from matters that necessarily includes private sector collection and use of 
information about individuals.  Further, the intelligence committees were 
established with what might have appeared to be a clearer foundation of national 
principles, principles which should serve as a yardstick for measuring the activities 
of private companies’ actions.  That is to say, longstanding Constitutional principles 
enshrined in the First and Fourth Amendments and long-held commitments to 
democracy and self-determination, as well as important interests of foreign affairs 
and national security, were implicated in identifying an appropriate balance 
between intelligence collection and individual liberty and national self-
determination.  Given that many of the most innovative uses of data-intensive 
technology today are arising within the private sector, rather than from 
government action, the source of authority to legislate in those areas will not, in all 
instances, arise from Constitutionally-protected interests as was the case for the 
intelligence activities overseen by the Church and Pike committees. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the current challenges in assessing how to 
maintain individual privacy and liberties against a backdrop of widespread private 
sector collection, aggregation, analysis, and use of personal information bear 
striking similarities to the challenges faced by Congress and the American public in 
the 1970s.  In other words, although the specifics differ, many common 
 
intelligence community of the United States Government.” H.R. Res. 591, 94th Cong. (1975). The Senate 
counterpart to this action was S. Res. 21, a “Resolution to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct 
an investigation and study with respect to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal 
Government.” S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
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characteristics exist.  Then, as now, technological advances had made it possible to 
collect more detailed information about individuals than had ever been possible 
before, and once collected, to use that information in more wide-ranging ways, 
from creating personal behavioral profiles to attempting to sway individuals’ 
opinions and actions.   
In the 1970s, these expanded capabilities to collect, combine, and use data in 
novel ways, raised widespread concerns about government surveillance and 
privacy-intrusive activities ultimately prompting Congress to establish the first 
select intelligence committees. The Church and Pike committees were endowed 
with investigative and oversight authorities that made them uniquely well postured 
to carry out thorough and wide-ranging analysis of the multiple problems that 
confronted them. The impact of their hearings and recommendations formed 
critical and effective parts of the long-term framework for overseeing government 
intelligence activities which still remain in place today.  
Today, data-intensive technologies have vastly increased the capacity for 
detailed information about individuals and groups to be collected, combined, and 
used in novel and ever-expanding ways.  While the Congressional intelligence 
committees continue to oversee the government’s use of that data for foreign 
intelligence purposes, much of the most innovative, and intrusive, new data-
intensive capabilities are being developed and deployed by the private sector, not 
by government.  With this evolution in mind, the historical example of the Church 
and Pike Committees provide an example of how Congress could take a similar, 
although not identical, approach and fashion select bipartisan, bicameral 
Congressional committees focused on policy and legislative issues arising from 
data-driven technology.  If properly constructed, these committees could play a 
significant role in identifying the scope of public concern, advancing the scope of 
appropriate legislation, influencing the course of executive action, and providing 
guidance for emerging jurisprudence on data-driven issues affecting individual 
privacy and other important rights and equities.  
I. PRECEDENT FOR ESTABLISHING NEW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
Congressional committees come and go.  By various counts, there have been some 
1,500 Congressional committees formed and disbanded over the course of the 
nation’s history.2  Many of these are established for a specific investigative purpose, 
such as the Select Committee on the Assault on Senator Sumner, which was 
 
 2. See, e.g., WALTER STUBBS, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, 1789-1982: A CHECKLIST VII (1985); 4 ROBERT C. BYRD, 
THE SENATE: 1789-1989 HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1789-1992 513–15 (1993); CHARLES E. SCHAMEL ET AL., GUIDE TO THE 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 1789-1989 289 (1989); DAVID T. CANON, 
GARRISON NELSON & CHARLES STEWART III, COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS: 1789-1946 SELECT COMMITTEES (CQ Press 
vol. 4 2002). 
 Time for a New Tech-Centric Church-Pike 
4 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
established in 1853 and expired in 1856.3  Others were established to consider a 
particular issue, such as special committee on the Atmospheric Telegraph Between 
Washington and Baltimore, an 1854 proposal considered in the U. S. Senate for the 
construction of a pneumatic tube that would allow conveyance of communications 
between the two cities.4  Others have related to specific time-bounded events, such 
as the special committee on the “Year 2000 Technology Problem.”5  Still others have 
been triggered by politically-motivated oversight needs, such as the review of 
campaign expenditures in 1924 and 1932, or the many investigations in the early 
2000s into the terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi.6 
On occasion, however, specially designated or select committees, established to 
address a specific problem, concern, or interest or a specific time, garner strong 
bipartisan support and demonstrate sustained usefulness that they become 
institutionalized as part of long-term reforms.  These committees shape how 
lawmakers approach the thorny problems associated with particular topics which, 
are acute in nature at a particular time, but also take on enduring importance.  It’s 
the contention of this paper that the House and Senate Select Committees on 
Intelligence are among these examples, and that, despite the deep and noteworthy 
shortcomings in their operations over the years, the enduring record of these two 
committees provides important lessons as well as a useful model for today, as 
lawmakers struggle to understand the ways in which data-driven technologies are 
reshaping modern society, and to consider ways in which legislation might help 
address those concerns.   
The times in which these committees were formed, and the challenges they 
faced, were no less pressing than those faced by Congress today. The challenges 
inherent in making appropriate policy decisions regarding data-driven technologies 
today cover a landscape of issues that are broader than those which confronted the 
Church and Pike committees in the 1970s.  There are nonetheless useful parallels in 
the challenges associated with deciding whether and how to investigate, support, 
oversee, legislate, and interact with the multiplicity of stakeholders whose activities 
and equities must be addressed if Congress is to have any hope of tackling modern 
data issues in a holistic fashion.  Despite the differences, described in more detail 
below, a number of situational similarities remain.  These two committees were 
first established in the 1970s against a backdrop of particularly fraught partisan 
 
 3. Assault of Charles Sumner, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. H.R., https://history.house.gov/Records-and-
Research/Listing/hi_003/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
 4. 31 WILLIAM B. DANA, MERCHANTS’ MAGAZINE AND COMMERCIAL REVIEW (New York, 142 Fulton Street 1854). 
31 FREEMAN HUNT A.M., HUNT’S MERCHANT MAGAZINE AND COMMERCIAL REVIEW 266 (New York, 142 Fulton Street 
1854). 
 5. See generally, S. Res. 208, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted). 
 6. 4 DAVID T. CANON, GARRISON NELSON & CHARLES STEWART III, COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS: 1789-
1946 SELECT COMMITTEES 755 (2002) (committee to investigate the 1924 campaign expenditures); S. REP. 
NO. 73-191, at 1 (1934) (committee to review presidential and senatorial campaign expenditures in 1932); 
H.R. REP. NO. 113-442, at 1–2 (2014) (committee to review the Benghazi attack in 2000). 
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concern.  They were established to address questions that Democrats and 
Republicans viewed through strikingly different partisan lenses.   
II. THE PROBLEMS THAT CHURCH AND PIKE SOUGHT TO INVESTIGATE 
In 1975, Senator Frank Church from Idaho dropped the gavel on proceedings that 
would fundamentally reshape intelligence activities by the U.S. government for the 
next half-century to come.  His counterpart, Otis G. Pike, in the U.S. House of 
Representatives did the same.  And although Pike’s Committee would never issue a 
final report, the hearings held by both of these specially appointed, bipartisan 
Congressional committees led to unprecedented transparency on the scope of U.S. 
intelligence activities.  The record they created through documentary evidence, 
witness testimony, and staff-generated recommendations led to new statutes, new 
executive orders, new oversight mechanisms, and even to an entirely new federal 
court with its own unique set of procedural rules, staff, and secure hearing location.  
The Church and Pike Committees were established by Congress as temporary 
mechanisms; special select committees to examine the urgent, pressing concerns 
facing the nation about the conduct of intelligence activities that affected U.S. 
persons.7  Part of the reason why they were necessary was that, up until that time, 
there was no single set of committees with jurisdiction over the activities of the 
agencies and departmental components that had become the U.S. intelligence 
community.8  Without direct-line oversight functions being exercised in Congress, 
and with some intelligence activities falling either outside the boundaries of 
Congressional oversight or falling between the jurisdictional cracks of different 
committees, it was all too easy for intelligence gathering functions to be carried out 
in a manner that escaped meaningful external scrutiny altogether.  This problem of 
oversight was compounded by the fact that intelligence activities fell outside the 
purview of the courts, and – for obvious reasons – were nearly always conducted in 
secrecy.9  
 
 7. See A Resolution establishing a Select Committee on Intelligence, H. RES. 138, 94th Cong. (1975) 
(enacted); H.R. RES. 591, 94th Cong. (1975); S. RES. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 8. For example, the House had an Armed Services Committee which had authority to oversee and 
investigate activities of the armed forces, but whose authority did not extend to CIA or the FBI.  The 
Judiciary Committee had jurisdiction over the Department of Justice and, with it, FBI, but had no authority 
over agencies such as NSA or DIA. The Committee on International Relations might be concerned about 
the impact that covert operations could have in foreign relations.  None of these committees, however, was 
empowered to oversee all of the activities engaged in by the Intelligence Community.  See Calendars of the 
United States House of Representatives and History of Legislation, 94th Cong., 4, https://library-
clerk.house.gov/reference-files/House_Calendar_94th_Congress.pdf.  See also S. REP. NO. 94-755, Book II 
at III–IV.  In that letter, Sen. Church wrote that “The root cause of the excesses which our record amply 
demonstrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitutional system of checks and balances to 
intelligence activities.” Id. 
 9. In its Conclusions, the Church committee wrote that, “For decades Congress and the courts as well as 
the press and the public have accepted the notion that the control of intelligence activities was the exclusive 
prerogative of the Chief Executive and his surrogates.  The exercise of this power was seen as flowing not from 
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The Watergate break-in of 1972, the Watergate hearings of 1973, and President 
Nixon’s resignation in 1974 had all paved the way for a deep mistrust of the 
executive branch of government.  The country – divided over so many domestic and 
foreign policy issues, from civil rights to the Vietnam war – was keenly burdened 
with a sense of the risks that were possible when government went unchecked.  
And a series of recent investigations had suggested that the U.S. Intelligence 
Community might indeed have gone far too unchecked for too long.   
A series of hearings and reports10 had brought to light a string of allegations 
about CIA assassination plots directed at the heads of states of other countries, and 
had raised questions about domestic spying on Americans by the CIA, as well as CIA 
covert action programs overall.11  Who, if anyone, was keeping an eye on the 
activities of intelligence agencies that had been operating with relatively little 
Congressional scrutiny in the decades since World War II?  It wasn’t just the CIA and 
covert action, however.  Military departments and their intelligence components 
were  alleged to have sent military intelligence officers to infiltrate activist groups.12 
 
the law, but as inherent in the Presidency.  Whatever the theory, the fact was that intelligence activities were 
essentially exempted from the normal system of checks and balances.” Id. at 292.  This view is supported by 
the language of Supreme Court opinion Katz v. U.S., noting that the court’s finding that the Fourth Amendment 
applied to electronic surveillance even in the absence of a physical trespass was a holding limited to the law 
enforcement context.  The court wrote that, “Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a 
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not 
presented by this case.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 23 (1967).  Similarly, the legislative history 
for the Foreign Intelligence surveillance Act noted that, “The history and law relating to electronic surveillance 
for “national security” purposes have revolved around the competing demands of the President’s constitutional 
powers to gather intelligence deemed necessary to the security of the nation and the requirements of the 
fourth amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly decided the issue of whether the President 
has the constitutional authority to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
purposes. Whether or not the President has an “inherent power to engage in or authorize warrantless electronic 
surveillance and, if such power exists, what limitations, if any, restrict the scope of that power, are issues that 
have troubled constitutional scholars for decades.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 15. 
 10. See, e.g., “The recurring need for reexamining the way Congress monitors the activities of the 
intelligence agencies was again highlighted during the investigation in 1973 of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities when questions were raised about the legality or propriety 
of certain intelligence activities of the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies.” S. REP. 94-675, at 4 (accompanying 
S. RES. 400. 95th Cong. (1975)). “Allegations that the CIA had been involved in plans to assassinate certain 
leaders of foreign countries came to the Commission’s attention shortly after its inquiry was under way.” 
Id. at xi. 
 11. “One of the main controversies raised by recent practices of the Central Intelligence Agency is the 
question of intelligence collection about Americans.  Unlike the FBI, the CIA was intended to focus on foreign 
intelligence matters.  Charges have been made, however, suggesting that the CIA spied on thousands of 
Americans and maintained files on many more, all in violation of its statutory charter.” S. REP. NO 94-755, Book 
III at 681. 
 12. “Although they are not expressly authorized by law, each of the military services investigates 
civilian groups, both within and without the United States, which it considers “threats” to its personnel, 
installations, and operations.  In the late 1960s, all of the services were engaged in monitoring civilian 
antimilitary groups within the United states . . . Most of the information gathered about these antimilitary 
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From newspaper reports to Congressional hearings, a series of revelations had 
revealed a seemingly endless string of tales about U.S. intelligence agencies 
infiltrating civil rights and anti-war groups, and spying on Americans from Dr. Spock 
to Dr. Martin Luther King.13 
In response to these snowballing allegations, in January of 1975, a newly re-
constituted Senate, with a Democratic majority arriving in Washington fresh from 
the 1974 election, passed Senate Resolution 21,14 establishing the Committee that 
would be run by Idaho Senator Frank Church, and formally granted the jurisdiction 
to investigation the actions of the U.S. Intelligence Community.15 The U.S. House of 
Representatives established a similar inquiry, a special committee which was 
created in February, 1975.  Colloquially known as the “Pike Committee,” after 
Representative Otis Pike of New York, the Democrat who had been tapped to chair 
it, this early attempt at House oversight of U.S. intelligence activities never quite 
got its bearings.  Distracted by the resignation of its original chair and mired in a 
series of battles with Gerald Ford’s administration over what information the CIA 
would and would not produce, the Pike Committee’s work was never officially 
released, although bootleg copies of its report were leaked to various outlets and 
found their way into publication in the U.S. and overseas.16 
It was against this backdrop of concerns that had been growing in the political 
consciousness of the country that the Church and Pike Committees’ investigations 
into domestic intelligence activities were launched.  On January 21, 1975, Senate 
Resolution 21 was introduced, calling for the establishment of a select committee 
to investigate federal intelligence operations and determine “the extent, if any, to 
which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the 
 
groups was collected from law enforcement agencies and the news media, but the services also quite 
commonly inserted their own undercover agents and informants into the groups.” Id. at 790. 
 13. See, e.g., Ex-Officer Says Army Spies on Civilian Activities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1970), https://
www.nytimes.com/1970/01/16/archives/exofficer-says-army-spies-on-civilian-activists-1000.html; Seymour 
Hersh, Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 1974) https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-
antiwar-forces-other.html; Ian Shapiro He was America’s most famous pediatrician.  Then Dr. Spock attacked 
the Vietnam Draft., WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/01
/05/he-was-americas-most-famous-pediatrician-then-dr-spock-attacked-the-vietnam-draft/. 
 14. S. RES. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 15. “Resolved, to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of 
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, 
improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any 
persons, acting individually or in combination with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried 
out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.”  Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Pike Charges CIA Effort at Retaliation for Findings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 1976), https://
www.nytimes.com/1976/03/10/archives/pike-charges-cia-effort-at-retaliation-for-findings-accuses-
agency.html; see also Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigation and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue 
Elephant, CIA (last updated June 7, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html. 
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Federal Government.”17  The Resolution laid out a number of specific questions for 
the Committee’s inquiry.  These included an investigation into whether the CIA had 
carried out illegal domestic intelligence operations; a review of the scope of 
domestic intelligence or counterintelligence activities against U.S. citizens by the 
FBI or other agencies of the Intelligence Community; the state of cooperation across 
the IC, and what role those interagency dynamics may have had in illegal activity; 
the nature and extent of Executive Branch oversight of intelligence activities and 
the need for increased Congressional oversight of IC activities; whether there 
needed to be specific legislative authorization for agencies such as NSA and DIA 
which didn’t have a statutory underpinning; and a list of additional enumerated 
questions as well as a catch-all authority to investigate such other and further 
questions as might arise during the course of the Committee’s review.18  The Senate 
approved the resolution, 82-4.19 
As would be the case for every intelligence oversight committee moving forward, 
many of the Committee’s hearings were held in closed session due to the classified 
nature of much of their review.  However, in the fall of 1975, a series of lengthy 
public hearings was conducted as well.  The Committee held 126 full committee 
meetings, 40 subcommittee hearings, interviewed approximately 800 witnesses 
(some in public and many in closed sessions), and reviewed 110,000 documents.  Its 
final report, containing 96 specific recommendations, was published in April 29, 
1976.20  Importantly, this is a scope of work that would have almost certainly been 
impossible had it not been for the creation of a select committee, with subpoena 
power, staff, and a mandate to carry out this work. 
The Committee was well aware of the historic nature of its work, noting as it did 
at the very outset of its report, that this was the first comprehensive review of U.S. 
intelligence activities to take place since World War II.21  The Committee wrote that: 
This final report provides a history of the evolution of intelligence, an 
evaluation of the intelligence system of the United States, a critique of 
its problems, recommendations for legislative action and 
recommendations to the executive branch. The Committee believes that 
its recommendations will provide a sound framework for conducting the 
vital intelligence activities of the United States in a manner which meets 
the nation’s intelligence requirements and protects the liberties of 
 
 17. S. RES. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted). 
 18. Id. 
 19. S. Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with Respect To Intelligence Activities, UNITED 
STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations
/ChurchCommittee.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 20. Id. 
 21. S. REP. NO. 94-755, Book I, at 1 (1976). 
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American citizens and the freedoms which our Constitution 
guarantees.22 
The committee took pains to balance the legitimate needs for intelligence 
gathering with the vital interests of liberty.  In doing so the committee recognized 
that “an extensive national intelligence system has been a vital part of the United 
States government since 1941. Intelligence information has had an important 
influence on the direction and development of American foreign policy and has 
been essential to the maintenance of our national security.”23  The Committee 
provided a devastating summary critique: 
Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government 
agencies and too much information has been collected. The Government 
has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of 
their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of 
violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The 
Government, operating primarily through secret informants, but also 
using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps, microphone “bugs,” 
surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast amounts of 
information about the personal lives, views, and associations of 
American citizens.  Investigations of groups deemed potentially 
dangerous-and even of groups suspected of associating with potentially 
dangerous organizations-have continued for decades, despite the fact 
that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity.  Groups and 
individuals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political 
views and their lifestyles.  Investigations have been based upon vague 
standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. 
Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed-including anonymous 
attempts to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons 
from their professions, and provoke target groups into rivalries that 
might result in deaths. Intelligence agencies have served the political and 
personal objectives of presidents and other high officials. While the 
agencies often committed excesses in response to pressure from high 
officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally 
initiated improper activities and then concealed them from officials 
whom they had a duty to inform.  Governmental officials-including those 
whose principal duty is to enforce the law-have violated or ignored the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their 
right to break the law.24  
The authors of the report laid the blame at the feet of all three branches of 
government, noting that each had failed in some part of its duty to secure liberty 
along with security. 
The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately 
controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has 
neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor established 
procedures for supervising intelligence agencies. Congress has failed to 
exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to which its 
appropriations were being put. Most domestic intelligence issues have 
not reached the courts, and in those cases when they have reached the 
courts, the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with them.25 
Although the Church and Pike committees focused on activities of the U.S. 
government, it is clear that there are parallels with the issues raised by private 
sector data collection today.  At the most foundational conceptual level, the Church 
committee was concerned about the ways that expansive information-gathering, 
and the follow-on uses of that information, intruded on individual privacy and 
chilled the exercise of Constitutionally protected rights.  In the Committee’s words, 
“Personal privacy is protected because it is essential to liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.”26  Further elaborating on this concern, the Committee noted that “our 
Constitution checks the power of Government for the purposes of protecting the 
rights of individuals, in order that all our citizens may live in a free and decent 
society.  Unlike totalitarian states, we do not believe that any government has a 
monopoly on truth.”27  They went on to state: 
Since the end of World War II, governmental power has been 
increasingly exercised through a proliferation of federal intelligence 
programs.  The very size of this intelligence system multiplies the 
opportunities for misuse. 
Exposure of the excesses of this huge structure has been necessary.  
Americans are now aware of the capability and proven willingness of 
their Government to collect intelligence about their lawful activities and 
associations.  What some suspected and others feared has turned out to 
be largely true – vigorous expression of unpopular views, association 
 
 24. S. REP. NO. 94-755, Book II, at 1, 5–6 (1976). 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. S. REP. NO 94-755, Book II, at 290. 
 27. Id. at 290–91. 
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with dissenting groups, participation in peaceful protect activities, have 
provoked both government surveillance and retaliation.28   
Had the Committee’s report focused on the impact of large-scale private sector 
data collection of information about individuals, and the subsequent uses of that 
information for purposes ranging from employment selection decisions to college 
admissions, from the likelihood of inmate recidivism to a person’s social credit, and 
from influencing a person’s consumer goods purchases to manipulating their 
political views, the concerns expressed by the Committee’s report might offer a fair 
reflection on the negative impacts that have resulted from widespread data 
aggregation by the private sector.   
III. KEY FINDINGS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT 
Key concerns identified by the Church committee in its report included the 
following:  
“1. The Number of People Affected…”29  Here, the final Report pointed to the 
fact that at least half-a-million domestic intelligence files had been produced, 
including tens of thousands of detailed financial files; hundreds of thousands of 
pieces of mail had been read; and millions of telegrams had been intercepted.30  
Although these numbers were staggering in the 1970s, the extent to which the 
private sector reviews individuals’ private communications puts this scale of activity 
to shame. Google and Facebook each review the content of many millions of emails, 
direct messages, and other communications every day, along with non-
communications content such as the keywords used in internet searches.31  
Although lawsuits have at times been filed against these companies alleging 
violations of the Wiretap Act and related provisions, none thus far have 
succeeded.32 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 5. 
 30. Id. at 290–91. 
 31. See Samuel Gibbs, Gmail Does Scan All Emails, New Google Terms Clarify, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 
2014), theguardian.com/technology/2014/apr/15/gmail-scans-all-emails-new-google-terms-clarify 
(“Google’s ads use information gleaned from a user’s email combined with data from their Google profile 
as a whole, including search results, map requests and YouTube views.”); see also Sarah Frier, Facebook 
Scans The Photos and Links You Send On Messenger, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:06 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-04/facebook-scans-what-you-send-to-other-people-on-
messenger-app (“Facebook Inc. scans the links and images that people send each other on Facebook 
Messenger, and reads chats when they’re flagged to moderators”). 
 32. See, e.g., Roxana Hegeman, Man Sues Facebook Over Privacy Issues, NBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/44809232/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/man-sues-facebook-over-privacy-
issues/#.XYbXaJNKh0s (reporting that a Facebook user’s suit, which alleged that Facebook violated wiretap laws 
by tracking the user’s browsing data outside of the app, will likely fail, because plaintiffs who litigate similar 
matters are typically unable to show harm). 
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“2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long.”33  Here, the report noted 
that “Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information about the 
intimate details of citizens’ lives and about their participation in legal and peaceful 
political activities.34  The targets of intelligence activity have included political 
adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activist to casual supporters.35  
Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial causes and women’s 
rights, outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment 
politicians; and advocates of new life styles.”36  According to the report, this data 
collection had persisted for decades.37  One of the areas of private sector data 
privacy practices that has come under increasing scrutiny is the persistence, over 
time, of the detailed profiles that are created.  Many companies are unable to 
articulate a specific age-off time for data collected about individuals.  This stands in 
stark contrast to the “right to be forgotten” recognized by European courts with 
respect to information which may be fully accurate, but which has been viewed as 
being too old to be of continued relevance when weighed against the privacy impact 
to the individual of continuing to make that information available.38 
“3(a) Covert  Action and the Use of Improper Means.”39  Here, the Report noted 
that government agencies had used detailed personal information about individuals 
to discredit them, cause harm to their personal relationships and employment 
status, and to prompt attacks against those individuals.40  This detailed personal 
information was also used to propagate misinformation in an attempt to dissuade 
citizens from pursuing lawful rights such as the right to assembly under the First 
Amendment.41  These findings have remarkable echoes with the work of groups 
such as Cambridge Analytica in influencing the U.S. presidential election in 2016, an 
area of concern described in further detail in subsequent sections of this article. 
“3(b) Illegal or Improper Means.”42  Here, the Committee’s Report noted that 
“the surveillance which we investigated was not only vastly excessive in breadth 
and a basis for degrading counterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted 
by illegal or improper means.”43  These means included reading individuals’ mail, 
 
 33. S. REP. NO 94-755, Book II, at 7. 
 34. Id. at 7–10. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 99 (interpreting EU Data Protection Directive to provide data subjects with a right to be 
forgotten). 
 39. S. REP. NO 94-755, Book II, at 10–12. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 12–13 
 43. Id. at 12. 
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wiretapping their phones, installing microphones in their homes and offices, and 
encouraging citizens to serve as informants on each other.44 
“4. Ignoring the Law.”45  This section of the Report noted that, “Officials of the 
intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal, but 
expressed concern only for “flap potential.”46  Even more disturbing was the 
frequent testimony that the law, and the Constitution were simply ignored.”47  
Here, the phrase “intelligence agencies” could easily be substituted with “digital 
platform providers” and a similar attitude would emerge.48 
“5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control.”49  Here, the Report noted that, 
“The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time 
were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and balances … was 
seldom applied.  Guidance regulation from outside. . . - where it has been imposed 
at all – has been vague.”50  The Report continued; “there has been, in short, a clear 
and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community 
and to ensure its accountability.  There has been an equally clear and sustained 
failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their 
activities and to comply with directives from those authorities.”51  The clearest 
analogy is to the work of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in regulating the 
activity of technology companies, and particular the major platform providers.  
Despite the fact that a number of companies are subject to existing consent decrees 
because of the failures in their privacy practices, the FTC often lacks the resources 
to carry out effective enforcement, and the companies subject to those decrees are 
not necessarily forthcoming in their ongoing cooperation with the FTC and other 
similar regulatory bodies.52 
“6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity.”53  According to the 
report, “many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American 
citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. . . 
 
 44. S. REP. NO 94-755, Book II, at 12–13. 
 45. Id. at 13 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Facebook, for example, has been accused of misrepresenting its user privacy practices. See Federal 
Trade Commission, infra note 53, at 1. 
 49. S. REP. NO 94-755, Book II, at 14. 
 50. Id. at 14. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. For example, Facebook was fined $5 billion by the FTC for allegedly violating a 2012 consent decree, 
the terms of which were intended to prohibit Facebook from making misrepresentations about user privacy, 
and to require them to put reasonable safeguards in place. Lesley Fair, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and 
Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, Federal Trade Commission (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov
/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-
restrictions. 
 53. S. REP. NO. 94-755, Book II, at 15–17. 
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sometimes the harm was readily apparent. . . but the most basic harm was to the 
values of privacy and freedom which our Constitution seeks to protect and which 
intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale.”54  These harms included “general 
efforts to discredit” individuals; “media manipulation” to shape public opinion 
regarding particular individuals, groups, or causes; “distorting data to influence 
government policy and public perception”; “chilling First Amendment rights”; and 
“preventing the free exchange of ideas.”55 
“7. Cost and Value.”56  Finally, the Report noted that domestic intelligence 
activities were expensive.  In the context of this report, the Committee was looking 
specifically at expenditures from the public coffer.57  Here, too, however, there is 
an analogy to be drawn with private sector data collection.  It’s axiomatic in Silicon 
Valley that “if you’re not paying for the product, you are the product.”58  The 
question that members of Congress and the public are beginning to ask is: what is 
the cost – in terms of economic value to the consumer, lost competition, and other 
measures of societal and individual impact – of these data collection and use 
practices which, until now, have been largely viewed as “free.” 
Each of these key findings has parallels in the 21st century risks associated with 
data-driven technologies.  To be sure, it remains vitally important to protect against 
government misuse of personal information.  But these risks have now been spread 
in ways that mere oversight of government activity is no longer sufficient to protect 
against the harms to individuals that may be associated with the creation, 
collection, and use of personal data.  As Congress continues to debate multiple 
approaches to a potential federal data privacy law,59 it will be essential for Congress 
to consider not only the contours of any specific legislative proposal that is 
presented for a vote, but also the manner in which Congress will organize itself in 
order to be best positioned to engage in the long-term legislative and investigative  
work that will be necessary to protect the rights of individuals and appropriately 
balance those rights against other important social goods and national values as 
data-driven technologies continue to advance and evolve. 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL MECHANISMS FOR CARRYING OUT INTELLIGENCE 
OVERSIGHT  
In 1976, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 400, a resolution “To establish a 
Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence and for other purposes.”60  The 
legislative history that accompanied the Senate Government Operations’ 
Committee report on the proposal noted that carrying out effective oversight of 
intelligence activities had long been an intractable problem.61  The Committee 
noted, perhaps with some frustration, that “since the passage of the National 
Security of Act of 1947, establishing the National Security council and the Central 
Intelligence Agency,” – nearly thirty years before the drafting of this report – 
“Congress has tried in a number of different ways to achieve close Congressional 
supervision of the intelligence activities of the Government.”62 Not that the 
Committee was keeping score, but the next paragraph of its report noted that the 
first legislative proposal for Congressional oversight committees had been 
introduced in the House in 1948 – and that nearly 200 similar bills had been 
introduced between 1948 and the issuance of the Committee’s report in 1976.63  
The creation of committees with specifically designated intelligence oversight 
functions could enhance oversight in a number of ways, including by “insur[ing] the 
existence of a trained, specialized, and dedicated staff to gather information and 
make independent checks and appraisals of [intelligence] activities . . .”64 
The drafters of the Resolution recognized the inherently interdisciplinary nature 
of the work that the Committee would be asked to do, and for this reason the 
resolution specifically required that the Committee include bipartisan membership 
from already-existing committees with particularly relevant equities, jurisdiction, or 
expertise.  Specifically, the resolution called for the Senate’s Select Committee on 
Intelligence to include fifteen members total; including two members from the 
Appropriations Committee, two members from the Armed Services Committee, 
two members from the Foreign Relations Committee, and two members from the 
Judiciary Committee.65  The members who overlapped with those other designated 
committees were to include one from each major party, so that there would be 
both a majority and minority voice representing those equities on the intelligence 
committee.66  The remaining seven members of the committee were to be selected 
from the Senate at large.67  The Senate drafters took pains to avoid the creation of 
rigid stovepipes.   
 
 60. S. RES. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted). 
 61. See S. REP. No. 94-675, 3–6 (accompanying S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976)). 
 62. Id. at 3. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 5. 
 65. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., § 2(a)(1) (1976) (enacted). 
 66. Id. § 2(a)(2). 
 67. Id. § 2(a)(1). 
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This new select committee would have the right to review legislation from any 
other committee insofar as it touched on the intelligence-related matters that fell 
with the select committee’s jurisdiction.  A reciprocal right was established for other 
committees to continue to be able to study and review any intelligence-related 
activity that fell within that committee’s jurisdiction.68  The Resolution granted 
substantive power to the Committee by conferring subpoena power on the 
Committee, and it avoided the trap of wholly partisan-driven work by allowing 
subpoenas for witnesses or documents to be issued by the Chair, who would be a 
member of the majority political party, or the Vice Chair, from the minority party, 
as well as by any other Committee member authorized by the Chair or Vice Chair.69  
The Resolution also required the new select committee on intelligence to make 
“regular and periodic reports” to the Senate on the nature and extent of intelligence 
activities to the Senate as a whole.70  
The Church and Pike Committees were initially established by Congress as 
temporary mechanisms; special select committees to examine the urgent, pressing 
concerns facing the nation about the conduct of intelligence activities that affected 
U.S. persons.71  Part of the reason why they were necessary was that, up until that 
time, there was no single set of committees with jurisdiction over the activities of 
the agencies and departmental components that had become the U.S. intelligence 
community.  As the work of the Committees proceeded, it became evident that 
there would be an ongoing need for committees with the scope, resources, 
jurisdictions, tools, and composition necessary to examine wide-ranging activities 
that impacted multiple dimensions of U.S policy, including national security, 
defense, foreign affairs, civil rights, civil liberties, free speech and association, 
political expression, and more. 
Congress was prompted into comprehensive oversight actions in the 1970s by 
the urgency, scope, and complexity of challenges raised by the ways in which the 
U.S. Intelligence Community was collecting and using personal information – 
particularly about Americans – to support wide-ranging and often murky national 
security and policy goals.  In the half-century since then, the creation, collection, 
and use of personal information has become far more widespread with the 
consequences which touch nearly all aspects of our lives.  The purposes of the 
collection today are equally murky.  Today, however, these activities are frequently 
carried out by private sector entities who face far less stringent regulation than that 
which has been the norm for the Intelligence Community ever since Church and 
Pike.  Congress would do well to embrace the sense of urgency that pervaded its 
intelligence hearings in the 1970s, and take similar steps: defining the social costs 
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associated with the use of personal data, and the gaps in existing Congressional 
oversight regimes, and creating a new framework for data privacy oversight that is 
equipped to tackle the challenge of modern data usages. 
V. A NON-EXHAUSTIVE SAMPLE OF DATA-DRIVEN POLICY CONCERNS THAT 
CROSS COMMITTEE LINES: PRIVACY AND SO MUCH MORE 
For even a casual observer of issues arising at the intersection of technology and 
law, it’s undeniable that the rate at which technology is advancing far outpaces the 
speed with which the law evolves. These technologies implicate individual privacy 
interests, where privacy is defined according to legal standards that have evolved 
over the past century.  What is sometimes less obvious to the public and to 
lawmakers is that these same data-driven technologies implicate other interests, 
beyond a narrowly-constrained set of rights to seclusion as in the American right to 
be let alone, discussed in more detail below, or right to be forgotten, as has been 
recognized in European jurisprudence,72 or the right to request access to, and 
correction and deletion of, information about oneself as in the California Consumer 
Privacy Act73 and European Union General Data Protection Regulation.74   
The ways in which personal information about individuals can be used to drive 
access to rights, privileges and opportunities,75 manipulate consumer behavior76 
and sway individual political opinion,77 used by employers,78 insurers,79 adversarial 
foreign governments,80 and other actors all point to the challenges of data-driven 
technology that extend beyond traditional notions of privacy.  The discussion below 
provides a brief overview of the origins of the legal definition of privacy in American 
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jurisprudence, as well as a non-exhaustive handful of examples of ways that data-
driven technologies which rely on personal information can have impacts that fall 
outside the scope of “privacy” as that term is sometimes narrowly understood.   
Taken together, and as will be discussed in further detail in the final section of 
this article, the range and diversity of these challenges underscores the reasons why 
new Congressional committees, specifically composed of members from other 
relevant committees, supported by professional staff with relevant and in some 
cases specialized backgrounds, are vitally important to Congress’s ability to keep 
pace with the impact of data-driven technologies on individual liberties and on 
American life. 
A. Defining and Legislating Privacy 
The right to privacy in American jurisprudence was famously articulated by Samuel 
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their 1890 article, “The Right to Privacy.”81  The 
article, discussed in more detail below, was rooted in the very same set of tensions 
that arise today.  The authors shared a generalized sense that there should be some 
recourse or remedy for intrusive actions that a civilized society would see as an 
affront.82 Changes in technology had made those intrusions more frequent and 
more troubling and although they would argue that longstanding common law 
traditions supported a right to privacy, it was also the case, prior to publication of 
their article, that American jurisprudence had not yet provided a clear model to 
articulate the specific set of rights or remedies that could be brought to bear in 
addressing these concerns.83 
The groundwork for Warren and Brandeis’ article had been laid in the years 
leading up to its publication.  One stone in that foundation was laid in 1880, when 
journalist and newspaper editor E.L. Godkin wrote about the need for a free press 
to investigate politicians and political candidates, and the necessary balance 
between that vital role in gathering and exposing information and the costs to 
reputation and privacy that result from it. 84  While the bulk of the article is devoted 
to a discussion of libel, not privacy,85  Godkin has harsh criticism both for journalism 
and the law.   
He noted that “some of the most prominent newspapers in the country have laid 
the foundation of enormous commercial success by wholesale indulgence in libel.  
They have found, in other words, steady and persistent attacks on the reputation 
of individuals to be the best mode of gaining the ear of the public and extending 
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their circulation.”86  He further writes that “Anglo-Saxon law, as well as Anglo-Saxon 
politics, has never taken much account of sentimental grievances; that is, of injury 
to the feelings.  It cares for property greatly, and attacks on property move an 
Anglo-Saxon community to any needful extreme of severity in repression.  It feels 
the deepest sympathy with the man who loses it, but it is unwilling to concern itself 
much about any man’s mental suffering, unless he can show that he is out of pocket 
by it.”87  The essence of Godkin’s examples, of course, lie in personal data.  Without 
information about a person’s life, however revealing, sensitive, or intimate that 
information might be, newspapers would have no basis for tarnishing any 
individual’s reputation.  In words that bear striking echoes of the Church 
Committee’s analysis of intelligence activities, Godkin writes that American 
jurisprudence takes the view that “the press is performing a useful public function, 
in which, however, it is apt to commit excesses and make slips, which have to be 
treated with a certain indulgence.”88 It is against this backdrop that Godkin laments 
the fact that 19th century American jurisprudence did so little to recognize 
compensable harm to a person’s privacy unless those harms could be directly tied 
to a pecuniary loss.   
In Godkin’s view, a person’s “private life … to every man who is worth much, 
make[s] up by far the better part of his whole life.”89  This “private life” consisted of 
“that portion of the personality which is not physical or tangible, the tastes, habits, 
prejudices, sensitiveness, manners, relations with friends and family, and the like, 
about which the civilized man ordinarily dislikes to talk to strangers or have 
strangers talk.”90  Godkin writes approvingly of the French legal standard under 
which even information which is true may be actionable, simply because “a 
newspaper spoke of matters in [a person’s] private life.”91   
Thanks to the intrusions of a salacious and widespread press, in modern life, a 
person’s private life is always at risk: 
We have got so far away, in our newspaper ethics, from the point of view 
on which this legislation rests that there are but few newspapers which 
do not, on the slightest pretext, publish everything they can learn of all 
that portion of a man’s sphere to which he least like to admit the world 
outside; and the practice grows.  There never was a time when people 
did not enjoy hearing about their neighbor things which they knew he 
would not like to tell them.  But as long as our law has a policy, as long 
as legislation aims to favor particular manners or customs from a regard 
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to the general good, we must admit that nothing is better worthy of legal 
protection than private life, or, in other words, the right of every man to 
keep his affairs to himself, and to decide for himself to what extent they 
shall be the subject of public observation and discussion.92  
Godkin’s plea for re-examination of libel laws in America was written in a tone 
both earnest and heartfelt, one that pointed to the important policy reasons why 
notions of privacy ought not be limited to contexts in which it was easy to point to 
a threatened property interest.  “I am addressing those,” he wrote, “who think that 
the private character and individual peace of mind are things for which a civilized 
community is bound to provide… the community has a good deal to fear from what 
may be called excessive publicity, or rather from the loss by individuals of the right 
of privacy.”93   
The framing of his argument made clear Godkin’s view that a chief threat to 
privacy stemmed from advances in technology – in the form of more widespread 
news outlets – coupled with the growth in volume and variety of personal 
information that was available, in 1880, about ordinary individuals.  Godkin wrote, 
When we consider the enormous increase in the number of newspapers 
which has taken place in the last half century, and the extent to which 
vast communities now rely on them for nearly all they know, or wish to 
know, of what goes on in the world outside private houses, one is forced 
to admit that to no art has the progress of invention and the growth of 
population made such additions as to the art of holding persons up to 
public odium or contempt.  Down to the beginning of this century, the 
power of any one person over any other person’s reputation or feelings, 
through what he might say or write about him, was very trifling. It could 
be exercised over only a very small area and within hearing of a very 
small number, and, as a matter of fact, a man could readily get rid of a 
damaged reputation by moving away a short distance.94   
With the 19th century advent of daily newspapers – that is, with the 
technological advances of the day – it was possible for individuals to suffer not just 
once, but from the “aggravation which results from repetition.”95  It is all of these 
factors combined which made the 19th century press the chief enforcer of 
“received social morality,” as, in Godkin’s view, “we have come more and more to 
rely, for the sanction of our social morality, on the strong concentration of public 
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opinion”96 – and these opinions were largely set by the papers of that day.  Much 
as they are shaped by both press and social media today. 
It was against this backdrop that Brandeis and Warren famously conceptualized 
the right to privacy as being encapsulated in the “right to be let alone.”97  Over time, 
that right to be left alone was further defined by William Prosser, in a particularly 
influential article, as consisting of four distinct but related causes of action: 1) 
Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 2) 
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3) Publicity which 
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4) Appropriation, for the 
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.98  This four-part 
definition has formed the basis of much of the tort theory of privacy law.  
Tort law is only the tip of the iceberg, as privacy law also stems from the 
Constitution, from federal and state legislation, from regulatory guidance and 
enforcement actions, and as American privacy law is increasingly influenced by 
international privacy law.  Against this background, privacy scholars in recent years 
have pointed to the shortcomings of Prosser’s four-part formulation of the Warren-
Brandeis “right to be let alone.”  One noted scholar, Daniel Solove, has pointed to a 
six-part conception of privacy that intersects in important ways with this article’s 
discussion of the ways in which the current Congress is ill-equipped to consider and 
address policy challenges raised by digital technologies.99  According to Solove, 
privacy should be thought of broadly, and includes the following: 1) the right to be 
let alone, 2) the right to limit others’ access to the self, 3) the right to secrecy, 4) 
the right to exercise control over one’s personal information, 5) a right to 
personhood that encompasses two key formulations in the right to individuality, 
dignity, and autonomy and the right to anti-totalitarianism, and 6) the right to 
intimacy.100  With this broader conceptualization of privacy, a great deal more could 
be encompassed than is currently the case under traditional notions of privacy 
torts.   
The challenge in defining “privacy” is evident in current Congressional hearings 
on federal privacy legislation.  Ever since the adoption by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare of the Fair Information Privacy Practices (“FIPPs”)101  in the 
1970s, the U.S. approach to privacy, from both a legislative and executive 
standpoint, has been a largely sectoral one.  Contrary to the frequent, and 
 
 96. E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 46 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 729, 729 (1880). 
 97. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82, at 193. 
 98. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 99. See generally, Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002). 
 100. Id. at 1099–25. 
 101. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973). 
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somewhat self-serving, criticism levied by the nations of the European Union,102 the 
sectoral approach has not left U.S. privacy law toothless or ineffectual.  However, it 
has led to a segmented approach to privacy legislation.   
For example, Health care privacy is regulated by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Availability Act (“HIPAA”) and its amending legislation, the Hi-TECH Act.103  
Genetic information is regulated – for limited purposes related to employment and 
insurance only – by the Genetic Information Act (“GINA”).104 Financial information 
is regulated within financial services industry by the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”).105  Children’s online information is regulated by the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).106 At the state level, all fifty states, as well as the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, have data breach legislation that 
applies to personal information.107  Although each of these states has defined its 
own scope and applicability, the current laws108 generally share similar attributes, 
serving as consumer protection statutes that require notification to individuals if 
there is a breach of information such as Social Security numbers, payment card 
 
 102. See, e.g., Jennifer Strong, Where European Countries Stand on Privacy vs. Security, PUBLIC RADIO INT’L. 
(Mar. 11, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-10/where-european-countries-stand-
privacy-versus-security. 
 103. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2002); Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5 § 3001, 123 Stat. 115, 226-32 (2009). 
 104. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 105, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008). 
 105. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 106. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.  §§ 6501–6506 (1998). 
 107. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx. 
 108. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides a notable exception to the overall similarity 
of state data breach laws.  See generally Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-.199 (Deering 2018).  The CCPA was 
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of amendments which were signed into law by the Governor of California in October 2019.  See, e.g., 
Assemb. B. 1355, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (amending to exclude consumer information that is 
deidentified or aggregate consumer information from the definition of personal information). As of this 
writing, the California Attorney General has issued draft regulations and is reviewing public comments; 
final regulations have not yet been promulgated.  As a result, some aspects of the law’s implementation 
and effect remain unresolved. 
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information, and in some statues, passwords for electronic accounts, biometrics, 
and health or other sensitive data.109  
When we look just at the privacy dimensions of the policy questions raised by 
data-driven technologies, no single committee has sufficiently comprehensive 
jurisdiction to tackle all the issues that need to be considered with respect to 
particular technologies.  For example, in just one week in May, 2019, privacy-related 
hearings were held in four separate Congressional committees.110  The Senate 
Commerce Committee held a hearing titled, “Consumer Perspectives: Policy 
Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework.”111  Less than a week later, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Financial Services and 
General Government held a hearing addressing the budget for the Federal Trade 
Commission, the nation’s top consumer protection watchdog and the agency which 
has taken the lead on most consumer privacy regulation and enforcement 
actions.112  The Senate Banking Committee held a hearing titled “Privacy Rights and 
Data Collection in a Digital Economy.”113  Finally, the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee held an oversight hearing on activities of the Federal Trade Commission 
to strengthen data privacy and security protections.114  Congressional focus on 
privacy legislation has continued throughout 2019, with further hearings,115 
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multiple bills introduced in Congress,116 and a group of Senate Democrats issuing a 
statement of principles that they view as necessary to any federal privacy law.117  
There is a long list of primary committees within Congress that have jurisdiction 
over some aspect of the impacts of data-driven technologies.  On the Senate side, 
these include the Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee,118 the 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee,119 the Select Committee on 
Intelligence,120 and the Judiciary Committee.121   
On the House side, these include the Energy and Commerce Committee,122 the 
Homeland Security Committee,123 the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence,124 the Judiciary Committee,125 the Space, Science, and Technology 
Committee.126  In addition to these nine primary committees, a handful of 
additional committees – such as the Senate Banking Committee – have 
subcommittees that can lay claim to jurisdiction over at least some sliver of data 
privacy, data-driven discrimination, government surveillance, and data-driven 
technologies as a key economic and trade engine for the U.S.127   
 
 116. See, e.g., Cantwell, Senate Democrats Unveil Strong Online Privacy Rights, https://
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In some instances, the decision about which committees have jurisdiction over 
particular topics has been driven by the way in which subject matter is defined – for 
example, as consumer privacy, health privacy, government surveillance, children’s 
online privacy.  In other instances, overlaps and duplications of committee 
jurisdiction, or gaps between committee jurisdiction, have been driven by the ways 
in which regulatory responsibility is apportioned across federal agencies.  For 
example, committees with oversight authority over the Federal Trade Commission 
may hold hearings or propose legislation relating to the antitrust and consumer 
protection implications of data-driven technologies.  In still other instances, 
committee jurisdictions are tied to the underlying legal authority – such as the First 
or Fourth Amendments to the Constitution.  In each of these cases, however, 
overlaps exist.   
Imagine, for example, a mobile app that collects individual health data and 
shares that data with social media platforms, insurance companies, companies that 
perform background checks for employment, data brokers, and political campaigns.  
On the Senate side, the collection and use of that data could be addressed by 
hearings in the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee 
(addressing health privacy and the use of health data in employment); the Senate 
Commerce Committee (focused on consumer protection and antitrust); the Senate 
Banking Committee (examining whether use of health data in employment-related 
background checks is consistent with the Fair Credit Reporting Act); the Senate 
Homeland Security Committee (examining election security and whether voters’ 
individual health care data was being accessed and used by foreign powers to 
manipulate voter opinion in elections where health care policy was a campaign 
issue), the Senate Judiciary Committee (addressing the use of digital advertising in 
election manipulation), and so on.  An equally complex picture of possible oversight 
hearings would emerge on the House side. 
Overlapping jurisdiction among committees is not new in Congress, nor does it 
need to be abolished.  Where, however, multiple committees focus on only a subset 
of the issues relating to a single set of facts, that narrow focus raises a real risk that 
gaps will arise. If the hypothetical scenario above prompted widespread public 
concern, it’s likely that all of these committees – and perhaps more – would hold 
hearings and consider whether legislation is needed to restrict how this data is 
collected, combined, or used.  If, on the other hand, the scenario prompted only 
low-level, routine concern among one of the many committees with jurisdiction 
over a part of this pattern of facts, then it is entirely possible that Congressional 
review could investigate some questions and altogether overlook other, equally 
important, ones.   
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B. Data-driven Impacts that Extend Beyond “Privacy”: A Non-Exhaustive 
Sample of Illustrative Examples 
Data-driven technologies have impacts that intersect with, and range far beyond, 
privacy.  These impacts include pressing challenges and include the potential for 
racially and ethnically discriminatory outcomes from artificial intelligence and 
machine learning algorithms.  The use of personal data as a means for micro-
targeting for commercial advertising purposes, and the use of detailed individual 
consumer profiles in order to manipulate elections through the development and 
placement of individually-targeted messages, have already been employed to 
exacerbate existing societal and political tensions.128  Whether carried out by 
nation-states or by domestic political campaigns, the use of detailed individual 
profiles to deliver surgically targeted political advertising, which addresses not just 
high-level demographics such as age, gender, zip code and income, but also features 
such as personality profiles, in order to sway elections raises a host of privacy-
adjacent considerations that were not nearly as pressing in the context of older, 
analog-era direct marketing campaigns. 
If these other impacts were entirely independent of privacy concerns, then 
perhaps each of these could be sensibly addressed in isolation from each other, 
each in its own stovepipe, each falling within the jurisdiction of a specific, discrete 
committee.  Nothing, however, could be further from the truth.  Privacy 
implications are intertwined with each of these other impacts, because all of these 
impacts arise from the use of granular personal information by data-driven 
technologies that can be employed by multiple actors for multiple purposes and 
with multiple outcomes.  Consequently, none of these data uses or issues can be 
effectively addressed in a vacuum, independently of each other.   
Privacy laws that aim to deal with the challenges of data-intensive technologies 
will be deficient if they don’t also address other dimensions of rights, autonomy, 
personhood, and social good that are impacted by these technologies.  The reverse 
is equally true.  Any attempt to address these other impacts – including but not 
limited to labor laws, research standards, antitrust laws, consumer protection, 
political interference, election security, discriminatory policing and criminal justice 
impacts, First Amendment protections, international commerce, and international 
human rights – will also fail if they are addressed in a vacuum without consideration 
for more traditional privacy formulations, and without consideration for each of the 
other bundles of rights.  As long as legislators examine laws relating to data-driven 
technologies in stovepiped committees with specific areas of focus, the separation 
of issues that is reinforced by distinct committee jurisdictional lines will exacerbate 
the already-difficult task of developing and passing sensible legislation to address 
data-driven technologies. 
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Before proposing an alternative approach structure for legislative consideration 
that could help close some of these gaps and move policymakers towards a more 
comprehensive approach to considering the challenges associated with modern 
data-driven technologies, it is useful to look at a handful of the disparate risks that 
are made possible by today’s data-rich environment.  The set of risks outlined below 
is by no means complete, nor should the order in which they appear be viewed as 
an attempt to rank them in any particular order of importance.  Rather, the list 
below is a non-exhaustive catalogue of the ways in which personal data – 
information from individuals, about individuals, describing the features and 
activities of individuals – can be collected, analyzed, and used in ways that threaten 
harm to individual freedoms.   
In other words, if what we mean by privacy is the right to screen our private life 
from public view, or the right to maintain certain information about ourselves in 
confidence, then it isn’t just privacy that’s at stake when information can be 
gathered and used in an ever-more-sophisticated number of ways.  As these 
examples show, the personal data that is collected about us is also used to make 
judgments about us, and to sway our own judgments about people, products, and 
issues to the benefit of someone else.  On the other hand, if we look at privacy in 
terms of the Warren-Brandeis formulation of the “right to be let alone” and 
construe those words to have their broad and commonplace meaning, then indeed 
the use of these technologies is all about “privacy.”  For it is through collection and 
analysis of this detailed information about ourselves, our personalities, our 
predilections and our peccadilloes, that the information can be exploited in a 
myriad of ways for our loss and others’ gain.  
C. Digital Piecework, the Survey Economy, and Unrestricted Human Subjects 
Research 
Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and complex algorithms are in the process 
of transforming the global approach to a wide range of economic activities.  Many 
of those technology capabilities require vast quantities of data to train the 
algorithms as well as to produce meaningful results.129  A great deal has been 
written already about the challenges of the “black box” of machine learning 
algorithms.  Black Box computer programs are self-teaching and, therefore, reach 
conclusions for reasons and in ways that their own programmers cannot fully 
predict, articulate, or explain.130  A great deal has also been written about the ways 
in which implicit bias is often incorporated into these algorithms, leading to a host 
of impacts that have deeply negative effects on society and on individuals, from 
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failing to accurately predict, identify, or assess individuals based on their gender or 
ethnicity,131 to perpetuating racial bias and other forms of discrimination.132  
In addition to these well-documented and important concerns, the rise of 
machine learning technology has also led to a number of unanticipated impacts 
relating to employment and human subjects research.  Both topics that fall outside 
the scope of what is typically thought of as “privacy” or “privacy law” – but both of 
which have impacts on individuals’ autonomy as well as an economic impact on 
society.  All of which are made possible by the modern technological capacity to 
collect, process, and analyze cast quantities of personal data.  
For example, the CAPTCHA boxes that visitors to many websites are forced to fill 
out, sometimes merely checking a box, and other times being asked to identify 
photo with particular characteristics or identify particularly hard-to-read text, are 
not only a means of ensuring site security by testing the likelihood that a site visitor 
is human.133 These CAPTCHA boxes also monetize the site visitor’s digital labor.  
Users’ clicks are being used to train an algorithm to recognize the storefronts, 
crosswalks, or cars depicted in the photographs.   
In doing so, the big data companies – Google in particular, which now owns 
CAPTCHA – are able to leverage the free labor of billions of global users.  The data 
collected by those who have to pass CAPTCHA security gates is used to train tag and 
catalogue Google’s data set.  Google gets the labor for free, and the impact on 
individual is, practically speaking, so de minimis for each instance, that while people 
find it annoying, they are unlikely to refuse to complete a CAPTCHA request if 
refusing to do so would prevent them from navigating to their intended destination 
website.  
The digital economy takes this monetization of online labor even further in the 
context of the survey economy, in which users are enticed to offer up detailed 
personal information in exchange for vanishingly small amounts of cash or other 
compensation.  More than anything else, it’s the new shape of what used to be 
home-based sweatshop labor.  This is the 21st century digital manifestation of 19th 
century piecework, when poor women living in urban settings eked out a living 
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sewing shirts for pennies apiece.  As the gig economy demonstrates, piecework has 
never really stopped.   
This new incarnation in the modern economy displays all the same 
characteristics of class division and exploitation, with wealthy people and 
companies relying on those who are already poor to do the most poorly paid work.  
According to the Smithsonian Museum of American History, there were stark class 
divisions between dressmakers, who created entire garments and could earn a 
decent living, and impoverished seamstresses who stitched together pre-cut 
bundles of fabric for desperately low pay.134 They were paid by the piece for the 
number of items they sewed, and often worked sixteen hours a day, but despite the 
long hours, earned only enough money to barely subsist. Even worse, the shop 
owners who assigned them the piecework often found fault with the workmanship 
and refused to pay the seamstresses.135 
One of the striking facets of the sweatshop clothing industry is just how many 
layers of exploitation were involved.  Tailors began making ready-to-wear clothes 
for a class of people who couldn’t afford individually-tailored clothes.136  In order to 
keep profit margins high, they cut the cloth themselves and turned over the pieces 
to slop-shop workers, usually unmarried girls and women – either young, or 
widowed, or otherwise in distressed circumstances.  These individuals carried out 
the backbreaking work of assembling the pieces while hunched over in candlelight 
squinting at the tiny eye of each needle they had to thread and each knot that 
needed to be tied.137  The tailors gravitated towards this model of work specifically 
for its economics; in other words, they could pay the women substantially less than 
they paid men. 138   
The exploitation didn’t stop there. As the women’s underpaid labor made it 
possible to produce ready-to-wear clothes for cheaper and cheaper costs,139 these 
slop shop jobs began to be used to mass-produce clothing for slaves in the southern 
states.140 Slaves could not be expected to purchase their own clothing, as they 
didn’t have wages with which to buy them, and slave owners wanted to keep their 
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costs as low as possible, purchasing the least expensive supplies possible to keep 
their slaves able to work.  Owners of capital commanded the resources to possess 
humans as property and to extract poverty-level wages from another class of 
persons. The cycle of exploitation flowed from one underclass group to another, 
with the wealthy slaveowners and well-to-do tailors profiting from both. 
As technology advanced with the advent of the sewing machine, productivity 
leaped ahead.  And yet, the workers didn’t see more income; instead, they were 
offered the chance to obligate money they did not have to purchase on an 
installment plan the very technology that would keep them toiling away for 
substandard wages.141 Concerned that the machines would put seamstresses out of 
work, several reformers urged manufacturers not to use them.142 It soon became 
clear, however, that the rapidly expanding industry still required the labor of tens 
of thousands of workers. Although the machines dramatically enhanced 
productivity and lowered the price of clothing, they did not greatly increase the 
earnings of these women.143 
The example of 19th century piecework bears striking parallels to the ways in 
which 21st century technology – particularly smart phones – provide a false promise 
of independence to modern gig workers in the data-driven economy.  As explained 
below, however, the mismatch between promise and reality may be even greater. 
Where sewing machines promised independence and delivered debt, smart phones 
offer the allure of independent contractor status in a side hustle gig economy, while 
delivering low pay and long hours. In addition, a sacrifice that 19th century workers 
did not experienced has become commonplace: the phones that we use to perform 
modern sweatshop labor are also siphoning off vast quantities of detailed 
information about who we are, what we like, who we spend time with, and what 
we do.   
It’s as if the 19th century sewing machine not only became the instrument of a 
pieceworker’s servitude to a vicious cycle of debt, but also served as the instrument 
to tell the sewing machine companies exactly how far into debt the pieceworker 
would go to purchase this symbol of hope.  This was in addition to simultaneously 
serving as the vehicle for informing the tailors precisely how desperate the 
pieceworker was for money while also informing the company precisely how little 
she could be made to accept in exchange for her hours of work.  As smart phones 
have become indispensable to everyday life, their prices have risen near towards 
the thousand-dollar range, and often are paid on multi-year installment plans.  If 
social media is the opiate of the masses, then our smartphones can dull the pain of 
an economic existence in which they are both the offerors of our moments of 
perceived freedom, and the means of our enslavement.  Offering us the ability to 
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have a side hustle driving for Uber or Lyft on the gig economy, delivering food for 
GrubHub or StreetEats, and taking surveys for money at a rate of 25 cents to a dollar 
an hour.   
It may seem like a stretch to compare this state of affairs to the digital piecework 
of today’s freelance survey economy, but a closer look at the business model for 
sites like SurveyJunkie, make it clear that the comparisons are apt. The Survey 
Junkie website invites readers in with an enticing call to shape consumer society: 
“take surveys. 
Get PAID.  Be an influencer. Share your opinion to help brands deliver better 
products & services.”144  Further down the page, it says, “Make a difference as a 
consumer.  Your opinion can change the products of tomorrow, today.”145 
The website’s “testimonials” are frothy and appealing, consisting of quotes from 
what purport to be real people, all of whom rave about the reasons they love taking 
online surveys on the site.  According to one, “Survey Junkie provides an interesting 
way to make a little cash while doing something interesting.”146 A second endorser 
gushes that, “I really feel like my opinion matters and I love taking the surveys. . . 
It’s a privilege to be part of the Survey Junkie family!”147 A third notes that, “It took 
some honest hard work, but I had fun doing it.”148 Another endorser on the Survey 
Junkie website offers the practical recommendation that, of all the online survey 
sites, Survey Junkie has “the best rewards.”149  
It is not just Survey Junkie.  The homepage for Vindale Research tries to draw in 
new users with a similar pitch: “Join the finest minds in consumer research and help 
change the world! Share your unique opinion and get paid for it!”150  LifePoints 
survey company makes a similar pitch: “Connect with the LifePoints community.  
Become a member of our global community while interacting with millions of other 
people who share their opinions. Join and be part of something special that will 
allow you to change your world. LifePoints is the place to be for those who want to 
be heard. We’re the bridge that connects people’s habits and views with what 
companies offer to consumers.”151  Global Test Market tries to entice users with the 
pitch that they can, “earn rewards for taking paid surveys; surveys are a fun way to 
learn something new; FREE to join.”152 
The marketing is deliberate.  “Influencers” in the social media world are those 
Instagram-famous celebrities who are often famous for nothing more than being 
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famous.  They have hundreds of thousands or millions of followers on social media 
– so many that every tweet and post gets thousands of likes, retweets, reposts, 
reshares.  A single video from a YouTube influencer can shape a person’s ideology.  
A single post on Instagram can cause sales of a beauty product to soar.  No one in 
today’s social media environment seriously believes that someone getting paid 
pennies for completing online surveys truly is an “influencer.”  But the very name 
appeals to our sense of existence.  It gives us hope that we have some relevancy in 
the massively networked digital world where it’s so easy to lose our true selves 
amidst the forest of idealized posts from friends, strangers, and influencers about 
all of the ways that they’re crushing it in life.  
By and large, however, the people filling out Survey Junkie’s online surveys are 
not leading fulfilling, picture worthy lives.  Many of them are college students trying 
to make side income to help pay for groceries in an economy in which 40% of college 
students experience food insecurity.153  Others are working class and working poor 
– people with enough income to have a smartphone and internet access, but who 
are living in tight enough financial conditions that making a little bit of extra cash, 
any extra cash, is worth doing if there’s a way to do it.  
So how much money do these digital piece workers make, and what exactly do 
they give up in return?  As part of the digital ecosystem, the world wide web 
abounds with sites that promise life hacks, side hustles, and ways to scrape together 
crumbs of cash in between more traditional hourly or salaried jobs.  Bloggers know 
that referral links can earn them endorsements and cash, so there’s some incentive 
to paint a rosy picture of other websites that are potential sources of 
endorsements.  Nonetheless, a wide range of review websites paint a picture of 
Survey Junkie that helps advise those who haven’t set up a log in yet what the 
experience is really like. 
According to one website that provides tips on how to save money and earn 
extra cash in the gig economy, Survey Junkie’s payment formula is pretty typical of 
online survey websites and may even pay better than most.  Take this example: the 
website “clubthrifty.com” has a very positive review of Survey Junkie that opens 
with an enticing offer,  
Have you ever spent a lazy day around the house wishing you could make 
money while you relax? Well, as it turns out, there are plenty of fun ways 
to earn extra money for very little effort. That’s right, you can hop online 
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when you’re not busy, and start earning right away with Survey 
Junkie!154 
Alert readers of the website might notice that above that beguiling intro is a text 
box noting that, “this article may contain references to some of our advertising 
partners. Should you click on these links, we may be compensated.”155  Of course, 
one of the clickable links is to Survey Junkie.  According to this particular review, 
when it comes to anticipating how much money you can make, “of course, it’s 
important to temper your expectations. The money you make won’t enable an early 
retirement by any means, but it can pad your vacation fund, help you save for 
holiday gifts, or even help pay off a loan a bit faster. Even if you only spend a few 
hours a month taking surveys, you’ll earn a few bucks you didn’t have before.”156  
The review emphasizes that Survey Junkie – with three million users – is “legit.”157 
There are a number of caveats to these representations.  First, nearly all of the 
surveys require the user to answer demographic questions at the beginning of the 
survey.  Sometimes the questionnaires are short and straightforward. Other times, 
simply getting through the demographics can take twenty minutes or more.  The 
demographics are essential to advertisers who want to obtain valid survey results 
and require some degree of confidence that the person answering the question isn’t 
submitting outrageous answers just for the purpose of skewing the results.  
Therefore, if a user’s demographic answers disqualify him or her from continuing 
with the survey, they don’t get paid at all by many survey websites.  
Additionally, the best-paying surveys are ones that require the user to activate 
their camera and allow the survey website to capture photos and/or video of the 
survey-taker.  Users are far more averse to this type of intrusion.  However, on many 
websites, allowing the site to take photos or videos of the survey-taker is the price 
for participating in better-paying surveys. 
According to one website that posts tips on saving and earning money, Survey 
Junkie is one of the better online survey websites.158  Users earn twenty-five points 
for signing up, and additional points for every survey they complete.159  Signing up 
is free and users create a login and provide Survey Junkie with demographic 
information that helps Survey Junkie match the user with surveys – generally 
sponsored by advertisers – that they fit the desired demographic mold for.160 As 
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each potential survey is offered, the user is shown a summary.  These summaries 
include the amount of points they can earn for successfully completing the survey, 
i.e., not getting disqualified in the demographic process or quitting before they 
survey is complete, and how many minutes they can expect the survey to take.  
Surveys paid as much as forty points for five minutes, or as little as forty points for 
twenty minutes.161  Every time a user completed a “profile survey” – providing more 
information about themselves – they received another ten points.162  
Eventually, the points are redeemable as gift cards or cash.  It takes a while, 
though.  The conversion is one dollar for every 100 points.163  So that survey that 
lets the user earn forty points in twenty minutes?  A user who completed three of 
those would earn credits at the rate of $1.20 per hour.  Even worse, nothing is 
redeemable until the user hits $10.00 worth of points164 – and some websites don’t 
allow users to redeem their points for cash until they’ve accumulated a minimum 
of $20 or $25 – something that could take literally days of answering online 
questions.   
Even the “really good” surveys that pay 10 points for a questionnaire that’s 
estimated to take one minute to complete aren’t a great deal.  If a user completed 
sixty of those surveys, earning ten points per minute for an entire hour, 
continuously and with absolutely no time required to navigate from the completion 
of one “lucrative” survey to another, the user would still only earn a maximum of 
$6 worth of points, for an entire hour’s work.165  That’s less than the federal 
minimum wage.166 And when you consider that the user is being paid less than 
minimum wage and giving up detailed information about themselves for the 
privilege of doing it, it doesn’t seem like such a great side hustle after all.  
As it happens, the ideal of even $6 per hour is unlikely to happen in a short time, 
as sites like Survey Junkie often don’t have enough surveys available to take.  
According to one reviewer, about the best a person is likely to experience is 
somewhere from one to three surveys per week, averaging about $12 per week.167  
All that said, a number of reviews have consistently ranked Survey Junkie as one of 
the best sites for this kind of online piecework, data-for-cash earning.168  Other sites 
don’t allow PayPal cash-outs, only gift cards or redemption by check sent through 
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the mail.  Many of them have expiration dates on points, requiring users to continue 
actively engaging with the site and providing more information and answering more 
surveys in order to get paid for the work they have already done.  
All of the sites serve up questionnaires that the user is not actually eligible for – 
meaning that users spend time answering preliminary questions, only to get kicked 
out of the survey before its completed.  Users find themselves ineligible for cash, 
points, or any other kind of payout.  The older, more established survey companies 
often pay even less to participants.  The LifePoints online survey platform grew out 
of a marketing research company that started conducting consumer polls in 
1946.169  Apparently, they still pay at 1946 scales, as participants can expect to earn 
between $.50 and $1.25 per completed survey.170 And even Global Test Market, 
which has been accredited by the Better Business Bureau, only pays between $1.50 
and $1.75 per completed survey.171  
These sites all have a number of features in common.  They entice users by 
touting the advantages of free enrollment – an advertising mechanism that’s long 
been known to channel consumer thinking into a narrow focus on only one 
dimension of a multi-faceted decision.172  They offer consumers the opportunity to 
feel as though they are part of something larger than themselves – as though 
through these surveys, they can have a direct and personal role in shaping the 
direction of future products, advertisements, movies, television shows, and the like.  
Many of them emphasize a sense of community even though interaction with other 
users isn’t part of the online survey experience.  And they all are heavily promoted 
on the hundreds of websites that hold themselves out as offering money-making 
ideas to people who are “frugal,” “cash-strapped,” “savvy,” looking for “life hacks,” 
or other catch phrases that can be used to appeal to a person’s idea of themselves, 
and through that appeal, talk them into spending time giving up detailed personal 
data for almost no monetary return, and without the kinds of entertainment value 
that they receive from online social media platforms.  
Looked at in this light, the survey economy has close parallels to the piecework 
economy of previous centuries, with the additional twist that the piece workers are 
enticed with inflated promises about payment and encouraged to overlook the fact 
that they’re being paid less than minimum wage and sacrificing an enormous 
amount of personal information along with their time. 
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VI. AUTOMATION OF THE TURING TEST, AND MONETIZING OUR LABOR 
ONLINE 
If you’ve spent any time on the internet, you’ve undoubtedly navigated to a site – 
perhaps an online ticket broker, or a user forum – that demanded that you click on 
a box saying “I am not a robot” before allowing you to proceed.  The site might have 
required you to decipher distorted text and type the letters into a box.  Or perhaps 
you’ve grown increasingly annoyed by the security tests that present a grid of 
blurry, distorted images and require you to click on all of the storefronts, or all of 
the cars, or all of the pictures containing a sign, before allowing you to proceed to 
the website you’re trying to reach. 
All of these are part of a system of digital testing designed to prove whether a 
human or an automated software bot script – a bot – is requesting approval to 
navigate to the link.  Over the past ten years, the most widely used method for that 
testing was purchased by Google.173  Since the purchase Google uses the answers it 
collects, from people who have no choice but to complete the forms to surf the 
internet, to train Google’s AI.174  Not only is our labor in training Google’s artificial 
intelligence unpaid; it also captures systematic information about the kinds of tasks 
humans can perform consistently well, and the tasks that humans have trouble 
with.  In other words, a cynic might note that Google is using these anti-bot tests to 
carry out a massive, undisclosed, and uncontrolled study of human cognition, using 
nonconsenting data subjects who don’t realize their personal data is being collected 
by a corporation carrying out a research experiment.  
In order to block bots, websites began turning to a software tool called CAPTCHA 
programs.  First developed at Carnegie Mellon University in 2007, CAPTCHA is an 
acronym that stands for Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell 
Computers and Humans Apart.175  The test is named after Alan Turing, a 
groundbreaking World War II cryptologist whose work for the British government 
at Bletchley Park, helped the Allied forces crack the German Enigma codes, and, 
through that staggering mathematical achievement, helped turn the tide of the 
war.176 It was Turing who first proposed, in 1950, a definition and standard for 
artificial intelligence.  Under what has become known as the Turing test, a computer 
could be said to “think” if, in a conversation, a human being couldn’t tell whether it 
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was interacting with another human being or with a computer.177 In the paper, 
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence,”178  Turing wrote, “I propose to consider 
the question, ‘Can machines think?’”179 
 He suggested an experiment: if a person is having a disembodied conversation 
by means of teletype answers (or, today, through a computer screen), can the 
person tell whether they’re interacting with a computer or another person?180  
Turing suggested that within fifty years it would no longer be necessary to guess 
what the outcome of the “imitation game” might be, because mathematics would 
have progressed so greatly that this question would no longer be a research 
hypothetical; we would be confronted with evidence of whether machines could 
mimic humans or not.181   
Turing’s prediction was prescient. By the end of the 20th century, computer 
scientists were taking a variety of approaches to constructing tests that would 
measure a computer’s “artificial intelligence” against a variety of standards, 
including the one that Alan Turing had proposed.182  Despite the ways in which AI 
research has branched out, the Turing test remains helpful background in 
understanding what CAPTCHA tests do on websites, and why they matter to a 
discussion about online behavior and personal data. 
CAPTCHA tests proved to be so useful that the software behind them was 
purchased by Google in 2009, a mere 2 years after it was rolled out by the Carnegie 
Mellon computer scientists.183  At the time, Google was in the process of digitizing 
its online library of books and needed humans to validate the text it was digitizing - 
to verify that particular text indeed represented particular words.  This was part of 
the process of “education” for the computer that Alan Turing had first envisioned 
in his 1950 paper.  CAPTCHA allowed Google to profit from both sides of a multi-
sided transaction: Google needed human labor to validate the digital text and train 
its artificial intelligence algorithms to recognize similar text samples in the future.  
Websites that were being indexed by Google wanted a way to ensure that traffic 
directed to their sites – usually by Google – was human traffic, not bots.  Google 
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stood to profit if it could provide a security mechanism to weed out bot traffic from 
users who navigated to new sites by clicking on Google-offered links.  The security 
check was yet another service that Google could provide to the users of the global 
internet.  Google matched up the human users with the security they needed to 
access websites and matched up training data with people who were willing to train 
AI.  This was partly because they did not know that was what they were doing when 
they completed a CAPTCHA request, and partly because they had no choice if they 
wanted to access the websites they were seeking to navigate to.  It was an elegant, 
and potentially profitable, solution to what might otherwise have been two vexing 
problems.  
Just as Turing had predicted, the AI began to learn and improve over time as it 
was trained on an ever-expanding library of validated data.  Google renamed the 
software to reCAPTCHA and by 2012, it was so well trained on text data that it 
needed new challenges.184  Google’s AI began looking at mouse usage, site 
navigation, cookies, and other features of physical and virtual interaction with a site 
to predict whether a user was likely to be a human or a bot.185  If the AI concluded 
the user was probably a human, then the “I am not a robot” checkbox appeared as 
an option, allowing the user to check the box, hit return, and proceed directly to 
the website they were seeking to access.186   
For users whose activity was not sufficiently bland and consistent with both 
generic human activity and their own typical online behavior, reCAPTCHA began 
presenting new challenges, like choosing whether a photo included leaves or a 
cat.187  By 2016, the person’s action in tagging the cat photo helped add another 
marked photo to Google’s library.  The effect of adding another data point to all of 
the cat photos that were being used was to train Google’s AI how to recognize a cat 
in the future when it came across an unfamiliar image.188  By 2019, AI researchers 
are thinking about what the next type of test should be.  In the short span of a 
 
 184. In the early 2000s, simple images of text were enough to stump most spambots. But a decade later, 
after Google had bought the program from Carnegie Mellon researchers and was using it to digitize Google 
Books, texts had to be increasingly warped and obscured to stay ahead of improving optical character 
recognition programs — programs which, in a roundabout way, all those humans solving CAPTCHAs were 
helping to improve.” Josh Dzieza, Why Captchas Have Gotten so Difficult, THE VERGE (Feb. 1, 2019 11:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/1/18205610/google-captcha-ai-robot-human-difficult-artificial-
intelligence. 
 185. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Google can now Tell you’re not a Robot with Just one Click, WIRED (Dec. 3, 
2014 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/google-one-click-recaptcha/; see also Katherine Schwab, 
Google’s new reCAPTCHA has a Dark Side, FAST COMPANY (June 27, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com
/90369697/googles-new-recaptcha-has-a-dark-side. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. “So it is hugely convenient then that Google has at its disposal hundreds of millions of internet users 
to work for it: by using Recaptcha (sic) to tackle these problems, Google can use our need to prove we’re human 
to force us to use our very human intuitions to build its database.” O’Malley, supra note 174. 
 APRIL FALCON DOSS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 39 
decade, AI had advanced so substantially that machines were becoming almost as 
good at image recognition as people.   
There would need to be something new, something that humans could do so 
much more effectively and accurately than machines that computers simply 
wouldn’t be able to compete; they would quickly be spotted as imposters by anyone 
playing the game. Until then, however, our need to access secure websites will 
continue to create incentives for Google to develop tools to recognize and assess 
human behavior – tools that rely on factors that Google hasn’t disclosed, but that 
likely have impacts to personal privacy.189 
Where the survey economy collects detailed personal information in exchange 
for wages, the CAPTCHA and RECAPTCHA tests don’t alert users that their labor is 
being used or that their data – in the form of mouse tracking and other behavior - 
is being collected without compensation to train data models for AI. The gig 
economy is facing the possibility of a range of reforms, with companies like Uber 
and Lyft having to face the possibility that their contract workers may be entitled to 
the hard-won benefits of regular employees.190  But that road is a long and 
uncertain one, and it isn’t clear that it will ever apply to the digital pieceworkers 
laboring away at giving up their personal data for cash.  Here, too, there are parallels 
in history, as labor leaders and social advocates called for better wages and working 
conditions for the pieceworkers.191   
As it turned out, however, collective bargaining was all but impossible for the 
seamstresses working in small groups or alone in their homes.  The same challenges 
extend to digital piecework today, carried out in dorm rooms and apartments 
around the world.  In some cases by people who don’t care if they get paid for their 
data and who are filling out surveys for a lark, and in many other cases by people 
whose time is so undervalued by society that even a few cents is worth hours of 
labor.  These are done in part to afford the disposable computers that they’ve 
purchased from a mobile phone provider on a 30-month installment plan.   
The full implications of the intersection of personal data and workers in the gig 
economy are beyond the scope of this article.  But digital piecework provides a 
useful illustration of how complicated the issues relating to data-driven 
technologies are, and how many disparate areas of law - currently scattered across 
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multiple Congressional committees - arise at this intersection. To further illustrate 
the point, it’s worth taking a closer look at another dimension of the digital 
piecework phenomena, and the ways in which paid online surveys raise ethical 
concerns similar to those that prompt review by Institutional Review Boards 
(“IRBs”) in more traditional research contexts.  
 A. Institutional Review Boards and Unconsenting Research Subjects 
Traditional medical and social research has, for nearly half a century, been governed 
by a set of regulatory guidelines and a longstanding set of and processes designed 
to incorporate ethics review into experiments involving human subjects.192  These 
ethical standards for human subject research have been in place in the U.S. for 
nearly a half-century, when the foundational principles were captured in a 
document known as The Belmont Report.193  The “Common Rule” for human 
subjects research and the Institutional Review Board, or IRB, process that grew out 
of that report reflects a recognition of the inherent worth and dignity of each 
individual, and imposes a set of specific obligations on researchers who want to run 
experiments that involve individuals. 
According to the U.S. National Institutes of Health, human subjects research is: 
“Research involving a living individual about whom data or biospecimens. . . are 
obtained, used, studied or analyzed through interaction/intervention, or where 
identifiable, private information is used, studied, analyzed, or generated is 
considered to involve human subjects.”194  This definition and associated rules are 
catalogued in a section of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations titled “Protection of 
Human Subjects.”195   
Strictly speaking, the regulations only apply to research which is supported, 
funded or carried out by federal agencies or federally funded entities - which 
includes many traditional research organizations, like hospitals, medical 
researchers, and universities, but there have long been calls for the Common Rule 
ethical standards to be applied beyond the scope of federally funded research.196  
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The regulations define human subjects research as “a systematic investigation, 
including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or 
contribute to generalizable knowledge.”197  The regulations govern collection of 
“identifiable private information” from individuals, where “private information” 
includes “information about a behavior that occurs in a context in which an 
individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place” 
or “which the individual can reasonably expect will not be made public.”198  The 
regulations govern interventions, manipulation of the subject’s environment, and 
interaction communication or interpersonal contact, and imposes an obligation to 
assess whether the research carries more than “minimal risk.”  
Under the regulations, an IRB may only approve research if all of the following 
criteria are satisfied: the research plan minimizes risks to participants; uses sound 
research design for its procedures; avoids exposing subjects to unnecessary risk; 
demonstrates that the risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated 
benefits, if any, to subjects, and in relation to the importance of the knowledge that 
may reasonably be expected to result; the selection of subjects is equitable; 
informed consent will be obtained; and there are adequate provisions to protect 
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of their data, including 
additional safeguards to protect the rights and welfare of; and if some or all of the 
subjects who are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,  additional 
safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of 
these subjects.199 In nearly all cases, IRBs require researchers to obtain informed 
consent from research subjects, explaining, among other things, what the research 
will entail, what the risks are, whether and how their information will be kept 
confidential, explaining whether the individuals are likely to experience any benefit 
or harm from participating in the research, and informing them that they can 
withdraw from the research at any time without penalty.200  The IRB must also 
assess whether there is a risk of more than minimal harm, and whether there is 
likely to be benefit to the individual data subjects.201 
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In 2017, the federal government promulgated a major update to the Common 
Rule.202  The final regulations articulated the rationale behind the update, which 
read in part: 
This final rule recognizes that in the past two decades a paradigm shift 
has occurred in how research is conducted. Evolving technologies—
including imaging, mobile technologies, and the growth in computing 
power—have changed the scale and nature of information collected in 
many disciplines. Computer scientists, engineers, and social scientists 
are developing techniques to integrate different types of data so they 
can be combined, mined, analyzed, and shared. The advent of 
sophisticated computer software programs, the Internet, and mobile 
technology has created new areas of research activity, particularly 
within the social and behavioral sciences …The sheer volume of data that 
can be generated in research, the ease with which it can be shared, and 
the ways in which it can be used to identify individuals were simply not 
possible, or even imaginable, when the Common Rule was first 
adopted.203 
The regulations provide a lengthy and complex set of rules that impose minimum 
baseline ethical standards for research that is supported by federal funding.204  This 
article doesn’t address those regulations in detail, nor attempt to parse the 
circumstances under which collection and analysis of survey data from or about 
individuals would fall within these regulations.205 
Rather, the point of these examples has been to demonstrate that the 
widespread availability of personal data has made it possible for private sector 
actors to collect, analyze, and use vast quantities of personal data in ways that, if 
undertaken by scientists in more conventional, federally-funded research settings, 
would at least require analysis under the legal and ethical framework that’s been 
established for human subjects research.  When, however, the work is being 
performed solely by the private sector, very few constraints exist, either on the 
collection and use of the data itself, or on how those uses might impact the 
individual whose data is at issue.  If these activities were subject to formal review, 
an IRB might question whether the data subjects have been informed and whether 
the benefit to them outweighs the harm of these activities, whether the activities 
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involve a massive market of unpaid labor, in example CAPTCHA, underpaid labor, in 
example Survey Junkie, and or other types of unrestricted and unethical social 
science research.  
It’s striking, perhaps, that Turing was criminally prosecuted and stripped of his 
livelihood for personal behavior of the very type that many people hope to keep 
private.206  If Turing were alive and living in England today, he would no longer be 
prosecuted under criminal laws that have, thankfully, been repealed.  But he might 
nonetheless prefer to keep his sexual behavior and relationships private.  And that 
is something that, in today’s data-intensive environment, is increasingly difficult to 
do.   
Each of these examples illustrates different dimensions of the privacy-related 
issues that legislators ought to be equipped to consider in deciding what kinds of 
data-related laws to pass, and what those laws should cover.  To the extent that 
Congress decides to consider legislative proposals relating to the survey economy, 
these disparate examples – involving marketing surveys and labor rates of pay, 
human subjects research, and collection and use of data and tasks to train AI 
without obtaining the data subjects’ consent – provide a non-exhaustive sample of 
just a few of the kinds of issues.  If these issues were to be considered on today’s 
Congress, they would span across the jurisdiction of multiple committees. 
VII. CONSUMER SURVEILLANCE: EAVESDROPPERS IN THE KITCHEN AND THE 
BABY’S ROOM 
Personal digital assistants like Amazon’s Echo, Google Home, and others are picking 
up audio and video feeds of previously-private moments in an increasing number 
of homes.207 Smart security systems like Amazon Ring, Google Nest, and others are 
recording video, and sometimes audio, from both inside and outside an increasing 
number of homes and apartments.  Sometimes capturing images not just of activity 
on the property itself, but of next door neighbors and passersby on the street or 
elsewhere beyond the property boundaries of the person who installed the smart 
security device.208  The scope of data collection by these devices is still poorly 
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understood by many consumers, who sometimes believe that data is only recorded 
when the device receives a direct command.209  On the contrary, much of this data 
– along with information from private company baby monitors, private home 
security systems, and others – is going directly into privately owned clouds.210  The 
companies have full access to the data and consumers have to rely on the 
company’s promises of reasonable data security and responsible use as their only 
assurances that the data won’t be misused.211   
Whether subpoenaed by law enforcement as evidence212 in a crime or 
inadvertently forwarded to other users,213 the data we provide to Alexa and Siri and 
the host of other digital assistants further adds to the complex picture of our 
everyday activities.  There are very few limits on what data they can acquire, how 
long they can hold it, and what they can do with the information.214 Even where 
legal limits exist, it’s an open question whether individual consumers can 
meaningfully enforce their rights against these companies.  And each of these 
devices presents even more complicated questions when it comes not to owners, 
but to their guests.  Do homeowners have an obligation to tell their guests that an 
in-home security system is recording them?  To tell the babysitter that the smart tv 
is watching them?  To unplug their Echo when having a conversation with a friend 
at the kitchen table, and the friend thinks the conversation is confidential? 
The growing popularity of smart devices, and the ever-expanding variety of types 
of smart devices, brings with it expanded opportunities for privacy issues to arise in 
what are, perhaps, unexpected ways, from baby monitors to children’s toys and 
home security systems. There have been multiple accounts of hackers gaining 
access to baby monitors and redirecting the camera, including one in which the 
hackers remotely redirected the monitor’s camera to take video of the parents’ bed 
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where the mother breastfed the baby and where the parents slept.215  In late 2018, 
there were news reports that a man had hacked into a family’s baby monitor and 
threatened the family.216  
The privacy issues are wide-ranging apparently wide ranging.  Video feeds going 
to peeping toms, and hackers using the camera to gain access to broader segments 
of the home Wi-Fi networks, potentially including access to computers and other 
kinds of accounts as well as to Wi-Fi enabled devices.217  Why is it so easy?  
According to security researchers, many baby monitors lack the basic security 
controls that are built into other kinds of computing devices in important ways.  In 
example hackers can automatically reset to factory default settings, which could 
have the effect of overwriting a custom-set password.218  Sometimes these devices 
enable security settings to be bypassed altogether.   
The South Carolina mother whose baby monitor kept redirecting its gaze from 
the baby’s bassinet to the parents’ bed is an example of this.  The family had set a 
unique password for the baby monitor – but apparently that password was 
overridden or bypassed by whoever gained access to the controls for the camera’s 
direction and feed.219  As concerns about baby monitor privacy have grown, tech 
publications and parenting websites have taken to posting reviews of the relative 
security of various makes and models of baby monitor.220 Several outlets are 
publishing articles on how to implement more effective security settings,221 and at 
least one toy maker scaled back its plans for an internet-connected baby monitor 
over privacy concerns raised by parents and legislators alike.222  
The challenge isn’t limited to baby monitors; cameras are increasingly embedded 
in children’s toys as well.223 In 2017, the German government urged parents to 
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destroy the “My Friend Cayla” doll, warning parents that the doll could be used as 
a spy camera to take video and audio recordings of unsuspecting children, without 
the knowledge or consent of the children or their parents.224 The doll can be 
controlled by an app, and uses speech recognition software to allow children to 
access the internet.225 But these features – while carrying a certain “gee whiz” 
panache in the U.S. where the toymaker, Genesis Toys, is based – prompted 
German regulators to declare the doll an “illegal espionage apparatus” under laws 
that prohibit surveillance devices in Germany from being disguised as other 
objects.226  The ban by German regulators was a fascinating one because of the 
tensions it brought to light between national regulations that are designed to 
protect privacy, and the individual consumer preferences that are sometimes at 
odds with the laws that purport to protect them.  In the case of Cayla, those 
tensions were on full display.  The German laws that Cayla violated didn’t just 
prohibit manufacturers from creating deceptive devices, or items that appeared to 
be ordinary objects but that had surveillance capabilities.  The law made it illegal to 
manufacture, sell, or possess any such devices.227  Once Cayla was declared to be 
such a device, the tension came into full view.   
Cayla had a great many vulnerabilities.  According to critics, access to the doll 
was “completely unprotected,” as it did not even require a simple password to 
access it and its Bluetooth signal could be hacked from 50 feet away.  This allowed 
a hacker to listen to the child’s conversations with the doll, and even to talk to the 
child through the doll’s embedded speakers.228  However, it clearly had wide 
commercial appeal.  Cayla had been named a “top ten” toy of 2014 by a German 
toy trade organization.229  Because it is illegal to possess disguised surveillance 
devices, in theory it would be possible for the government to prosecute families for 
having a Cayla doll in their homes.   
Cayla is hardly the only instance of a poorly protected internet-connected toy.  
The Cloud Pets toys that allowed children to send and receive audio messages were 
pulled from stores after security researchers discovered a serious security flaw.  
Children’s names, ages, and voice recordings were easily accessible on the internet 
because the manufacturer had failed to implement password-protection on the 
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cloud system where records, including audio files, from and about the children 
using the toys were stored.230  Another example, the Fisher-Price Smart Toy Bear, a 
wi-fi connected stuffed animal, was marketed to consumers as “an interactive 
learning friend that talks, listens, and remembers what your child says and even 
responds when spoken to.”231   
According to a Senate report, security researchers discovered a security 
vulnerability that would make it possible for hackers to access the smart toy server 
and view children’s information, and even take over control of the toy.232  The same 
report also described the vulnerabilities found in a children’s GPS tracking watch 
that made it possible for hackers to gain unauthorized access to the location 
information of the children wearing the devices and the family members who had 
joined a the group location sharing feature offered by the watch’s app.233  In a 
different kind of privacy incident, the 2015 cyberattack on the network of toy 
company VTech allowed hackers to gain access to the home addresses, and 
photographs of over six million children.234  In recognition of these risks, the FBI 
issued a public service announcement (“PSA”) in 2017 warning about the privacy 
risks of internet-connected toys.235  According to the release,  
The FBI encourages consumers to consider cyber security prior to 
introducing smart, interactive, internet-connected toys into their homes 
or trusted environments.  … These toys typically contain sensors, 
microphones, cameras, data storage components, and other multimedia 
capabilities – including speech recognition and GPS option.  These 
features could put the privacy and safety of children at risk due to the 
large amount of personal information that may be unwittingly 
disclosed.236 
Although the FBI points to the risk of what it refers to as “child identity fraud,”237 
the other dangers described in the PSA are far more chilling.  The PSA points out 
that in some cases, toys’ microphones can record and collect conversations that are 
within earshot, and that  
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Information such as the child’s name, school, likes and dislikes, and 
activities may be disclosed through normal conversation with the toy or 
in the surrounding environment. . . In addition, companies collect large 
amounts of additional data such as voice messages, conversation 
recordings, past and real-time physical locations, Internet use history, 
and Internet addresses/ IPs.238   
As a result, “the potential misuse of sensitive data such as GPS location 
information, visual identifiers from pictures or videos, and known interests to 
garner trust from a child could present exploitation risks.”239  As it turns out, even 
security systems can backfire, as in the 2019 incident in which an unauthorized user 
gained audio and video access to an Amazon Ring camera installed in a children’s 
bedroom, and used that access to harass the family’s eight year old daughter.240 
Smart home security systems have prompted other concerns as well.  Civil 
liberties groups have objected to the widespread sharing of Amazon Ring video 
surveillance with police departments around the country.241  The popular security 
cameras are intended to record video in the area surrounding the door to an 
apartment or home, but their field of view often extends far beyond a front stoop, 
recording actions and interactions of residents and passersby, many of whom may 
not suspect that their actions are being surveilled.242  The surveillance isn’t limited 
to cameras installed on individual homes, but can also be carried out as a group 
effort, as homeowners’ associations install security cameras to monitor community 
streets.243  Although current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally permits 
law enforcement to obtain information from third parties without a warrant under 
the Third Party doctrine,244 several of the opinions in a 2018 Supreme Court decision 
have called into question whether the Third Party doctrine should be modified or 
altogether cast aside.245  
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This small sampling of privacy issues arising from data-driven consumer devices 
further illustrates the challenge for Congress in determining how to investigate and 
legislate these devices and their risks.  Certainly, the House and Senate Commerce 
Committees have jurisdiction to review the privacy risks associated with these 
products. But some aspects of surveillance that these products make possible – like 
sharing of home video surveillance data with police – is a matter whose implications 
fall squarely within the scope of the Congressional Judiciary committees.  As with 
other areas of data-driven technology, assessing the full privacy and other 
implications of smart consumer products not only is likely to cross committee 
jurisdictional lines; it is likely that Congress could be more effective, and better 
equipped, to assess the full range of potential issues if it had the benefit of a 
standing committee able to review these concerns through a comprehensive lens 
that takes into account multiple areas of law.  
VIII. ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS IN PRIVACY CASES SHOW THAT 
DEFINITIONS OF COMPENSABLE HARM REMAIN UNCLEAR 
There is a deep and significant split among federal circuits on the question of 
standing for data privacy cases, in which the standing analysis rests primarily on the 
question of whether various types of data breaches, or unauthorized access to 
personal information, constitute a compensable harm under applicable law.246  
Under the lines of case law interpreting Spokeo v. Robbins,247security breaches 
involving qualitative information such as photographs, user profile behavior and 
biometric information are  frequently not recognized as compensable harms under 
U.S. law, even when the alleged harms take place in violation of a statute.248   
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court held that in actions under federal statutes, a bare 
statutory violation is not enough by itself to provide a plaintiff with standing to 
sue.249  Instead, drawing from a substantial body of federal jurisprudence, the 
Spokeo Court held that in order to meet the minimum standard for standing to sue 
under Article III of the Constitution, an injured plaintiff must show that the injury is 
both concrete and particularized, that it is actual or imminent, and that it is not 
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conjectural or hypothetical, none of which can be shown by a “bare procedural 
violation” of a statute.250  Standing can be even more difficult to demonstrate when 
the alleged injury doesn’t arise from violation of a statute, but from violation of a 
company’s privacy policy or terms of use.251 Recent cases from the Illinois Supreme 
Court and the 9th Circuit have found compensable harm resulting from the violation 
of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.252  The analysis in both cases rested 
squarely on the demonstrated intent of the Illinois legislature, as captured in both 
the legislative history and the language of the statute, to recognize the important 
privacy interests that individuals have in their biometric information.253   
When VTech suffered the data breach that exposed children’s personal 
information, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, currently the nation’s top 
watchdog for privacy matters, stepped in to investigate.254  The result of that 
investigation was a settlement in which VTech agreed to pay a $650,000 fine to the 
government for violating COPPA.255  Specifically, for failing to provide notice and 
obtain parental consent prior to collecting personal information from children, and 
for failing to take “reasonable and appropriate data security measures” to protect 
 
 250. Id. at 1548–50. 
 251. This issue is currently being litigated in the 9th Circuit, in the consumer class action lawsuit brought 
against Facebook for sharing users’ profile information with political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica.  In a 
September, 2019 ruling, Judge Vincent Chhabria of the northern District of California ruled that plaintiffs’ case 
could proceed, despite defendant Facebook’s arguments that: 1) users “have no legitimate privacy interest in 
information they make available to their friends on social media; 2) that “even its users had a privacy interest 
in the information they made available only to friends, there is no standing to sue in federal court because there 
were no tangible negative consequences from the dissemination of this information;” and 3) that “even if users 
retained a privacy interest in the information that was disclosed, and even if a ‘bare’ privacy invasion confers 
standing to sue in federal court, this lawsuit must be dismissed because Facebook users consented, in fine print, 
to the wide dissemination of their sensitive information.” Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2, In re: Facebook, Inc. Consumer 
User Privacy Profile Litigation, 402 F.Supp.3d 767 (2019). 
 252. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act is codified at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT  14/1 et seq. (2019).  See 
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186 (Jan 25, 2019); see also Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 
1263 (2019).  The complaint in Rosenbach was filed in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois in January 2016.  
See Complaint, Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186.  The complaint in In re Facebook was filed in the Northern District 
of California in August 2015.  See Complaint, In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litig., No. 3:15-cv-
03747-JD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015). 
 253. See generally Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186. Looking at the important interests that BIPA protects, the 
Rosenbach court found that “It is clear that the legislature intended for this provision to have substantial force. 
… To require individuals to wait until they have sustained some compensable injury beyond violation of their 
statutory rights before they may seek recourse, as defendants urge, would be completely antithetical to the 
Act’s preventive and deterrent purposes.”  Id. at 9. 
See also Patel, 932 F.3d at 18 (concluding “that ‘the statutory provisions at issue’ in BIPA were established 
to protect an individual’s ‘concrete interests’ in privacy, not merely procedural rights”). 
 254. Electronic Toy Maker Vtech Settles FTC Allegations that it Violated Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC 
Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/electronic-
toy-maker-vtech-settles-ftc-allegations-it-violated. 
 255. Id. 
 APRIL FALCON DOSS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 51 
the personal data that VTech was collecting.256 The settlement also includes a 
consent decree; an agreement through which VTech is required to demonstrate its 
compliance with certain basic levels of data privacy protection, and to submit to 
oversight from the FTC to verify that the company is living up to its promises to 
implement more rigorous data privacy practices in the future.257  Although the 
consent decree can, if aggressively monitored by the FTC, have real teeth in its 
impact on the company, and although the amount of the fine was significant, it’s an 
open question as to how much a privacy violation should be worth.  Additionally, it 
must be determined whether the violation will be measured by the number of 
children and families affected, or by the revenue, profits, or other measure of 
wealth of the company.  In the VTech case, VTech was accused of collecting data 
without proper notice and consent from some three million children, with records 
from hundreds of thousands of those accounts compromised when hackers 
accessed the VTech customer-data storage system.258  The same year as the hack, 
2015, VTech reported revenue of over fourteen billion dollars, and in 2018, the year 
that the settlement agreement with the FTC was reached, VTech reported over 
sixteen billion dollars in earnings according to MarketWatch.259  With the $650,000 
fine amounting to a small fraction of that annual sales revenue, it’s hard to know 
whether a fine of this magnitude amounts to a true deterrent, or is little more than 
the cost of doing business.  
Although laws like COPPA provide some privacy protection for children, and FTC 
investigations and enforcement actions present a risk to companies and give them 
reason to be diligent in how they handle data, none of those measures help to 
compensate the children or parents.  These individuals are the people whose 
personal information has been scooped up in ways they didn’t imagine, or shared 
with third parties they didn’t expect, or used to create personal profiles that form 
the basis for future commercial advertising and other marketing.  Congress’s role in 
privacy interests becomes particularly evident in the context of cases like those 
cited above, which demonstrate the ways in which various courts have grappled 
with the issue of standing and harm in data privacy and security litigation. Where 
some courts have recognized that privacy interests stem from, and are tied to, 
multiple sources of law, including common law, constitutionally protected zones of 
privacy, the Fourth Amendment, and statutes,260 other courts have taken a 
narrower view.261   
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While the existing Circuit split may be resolved in part if the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in cases that are likely to help clarify these differing 
interpretations of Spokeo’s applicability, Congress has the opportunity to play an 
equally important and potentially more immediately clarifying role.  If Congress 
were to pass federal privacy legislation which includes both legislative history and 
legislative text clarifying the extent to which Congress intends to recognize 
substantive rights versus procedural requirements, that legislation could provide 
useful and effective clarity for companies, for individuals, and for future courts and 
litigants.  In order to do that effectively, however, Congress would do well to 
consider the same wide-ranging scope of sources for privacy interest that have been 
recognized elsewhere, such as by the Ninth Circuit in Patel.262   
Questions concerning the Fourth Amendment more typically arise in the 
Congressional judiciary, intelligence, and homeland security committees.  Issues 
involving Constitutionally protected zones of privacy may arise in Congressional 
committees addressing health-related issues.  Consumer protection issues often 
arise in the Congressional commerce committees, but may arise elsewhere as 
well.263  Congress would be better postured to carry out a holistic review of the 
various dimensions of privacy-related interests, to make reasoned judgments about 
what capabilities of data-driven technologies intersect with individuals’ substantive 
privacy and related interests, and to craft legislation that makes sensible 
distinctions between substantive rights and procedural requirements if the 
Congressional committee process was better organized to bring together the 
necessary perspective to assess the wide-ranging nature of privacy interests and 
concerns,  
IX. ELECTION SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
In recent years, online propaganda techniques have been used to influence 
everything from the public response to protests in Ferguson, Missouri and 
Baltimore, Maryland, to the Brexit vote in Britain, to the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election, and to the elections in Germany and France in 2017 and 2018.264  Social 
media platforms became a hotbed of propaganda activity and fake news that was 
propagated by automated bots, human trolls, and a nearly endless supply of 
posts.265  What made these influence campaigns so successful, however, wasn’t the 
mere fact of posting articles or ads.  It was the use of individuals’ personal data to 
create detailed, micro-targeted messages, to direct ads, pages, posts and other 
content specifically to users who would be most susceptible to its messages and in 
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the places that mattered the most.  Social media manipulators are using our own 
personal data as the most formidable weapon against us, and apparently to great 
effect.  
In March 2019, Robert Mueller’s Office of Special Counsel released a two-volume 
report on Russia’s interference with the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.266  Based 
on nearly two years of investigation, Mueller and his team concluded that “The 
Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and 
systematic fashion.”267  One prong of that interference was an “active measures” 
campaign involving the use of fake social media accounts to sway opinion in the 
U.S.268  Specifically, the Russian government worked through a St. Petersburg-based 
troll farm doing business as a company called the Internet Research Agency (“IRA”), 
run by a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.269 The IRA active 
measures efforts began in 2014, with IRA employees visiting the U.S. to carry out 
reconnaissance, and very quickly thereafter establishing fake accounts on 
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and other social media platforms.270  “By the end of 
the 2016 U.S. election,” notes the report, “the IRA had the ability to reach millions 
of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled 
Facebook groups and Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. 
participants… Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons 
through its Facebook accounts.”271  All of these accounts were designed to appear 
as if they were legitimate accounts associated with real U.S. people.272  This Russian 
intelligence operation is an important story in geopolitical affairs generally, as it 
provides a stark example of the Kremlin’s escalation of the types of political 
interference that it has engaged in for years via more traditional means.273  
However, for purposes of this article, a key feature of that active measures 
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campaign is the fact that the IRA actively leveraged the personal data profiles 
available through social media platforms to target its advertising towards its 
intended audience.   
According to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report, “The IRA used 
Facebook’s geographic targeting feature to channel advertisements to intended 
audiences in specific U.S. locations.  About twenty-five percent of the 
advertisements purchased by the IRA were targeted down to the state, city, or in 
some instances, university level.  Specific content narratives emerge[d] in 
connection with targeted locations.”274  The report notes that the social media 
platforms make available tools that could have allowed even more granular 
advertising, and a more focused attempt to direct specific messages to particular 
audiences, all based on the rich and complex personal data profiles that Facebook 
builds on its users; had the IRA done so, their manipulative and divisive social and 
political messages might have had even greater impact.  According to the SSCI 
report, “Facebook indicates that the IRA did not leverage the platform’s Custom 
Audiences tool, which would have entailed uploading or importing an externally 
held list of advertisement targets or contact data, revealing the IRA’s efforts were 
not as effective as they could have been.”275 
The fake identities for the accounts varied widely.  For example, one of the most 
widely followed IRA trolls was a Twitter account with the handle @TEN_GOP – an 
account that fooled hundreds of thousands of Twitter users into believing that it 
was an “unofficial account” of the Tennessee Republican party. Another account, 
@Jenn_Abrams,  famously duped her 70,000 Twitter followers and countless other 
Twitter users who interacted with her content: Roseanne Barr argued with her on 
Twitter, a celebrity news outlet called Brit & Co wrote a whole article about the troll 
account’s tweets on Kim Kardashian. 276  The fake account posed tweets about pop 
culture, ballistic missiles, the Confederate flag, and Rachel Dolezal.277  Her tweets 
were featured in articles in USA Today, the New York times, The Daily Caller, 
Buzzfeed, and a host of other U.S. and international news outlets.278 Abrams 
followed a modus operandi common to many of these troll accounts: build up a 
following with an entertaining and engaging online persona that posted content 
about nonpartisan issues – celebrity gossip, general news – and then, after 
attracting a substantial following, start pushing out deeply divisive content on 
wedge issues in American politics, like immigration, race, and gay rights and, closer 
to the 2016 election, content deeply critical of, or spreading conspiracy theories 
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about, Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton.279  Abrams was particularly successful at 
creating a total package of a person; in addition to her Twitter, she also had a 
personal website, a Medium page, a Gmail address, and a GoFundMe page.280  
A research study recently published in the Columbia Journalism Review 
concluded that most major news outlets had at some point in time unknowingly 
quoted Russian hoax accounts, usually in stories reporting on public reaction to 
recent public events or controversies in the news.281  Perhaps not surprisingly, news 
outlets with a more left- or right-leaning bent were more likely to report on the 
often incendiary social media posts: The Daily Caller and Huffington Post were the 
outlets that most frequently published quotes from fake social media accounts.282 
But the challenge of differentiating authentic accounts from fake ones – the 
problem of differentiating the true from the false, hit major mainstream news 
outlets in the center of the political spectrum as well, including such highly regarded 
ones as The New York Times, NPR, and the Washington Post.283  
Neither the criminal indictments against the IRA nor the widespread news 
coverage about Russia’s fake social media profiles and influence campaign seem to 
have had any deterrent effect.  It is now widely believed that the Russian 
government carried out similar influence operations in the run-up to Great Britain’s 
Brexit vote.284  More recently, Russia’s troll farms were accused of attempting to 
influence the presidential election in France,285 the German prime minister election 
in 2017,286 and of stoking France’s “yellow vest” protests in 2018.287  Russian troll 
farms were implicated in using Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts in their 
attempts to sway European Union elections in 2019.288  The playbook was the same 
as it had been in the U.S. in 2016: suppress voter turnout, deepen political divides, 
and advance a far-right policy agenda through fake accounts, disinformation, and 
the exploitations of local political divisions that were already existing.  Adding insult 
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to injury, in 2019, a Russian troll farm that was a close cousin to the IRA, the Federal 
Agency of News, had the temerity to file a lawsuit in U.S. federal court, charging 
Facebook with violating its First Amendment rights for expelling it from 
Facebook.289 
Reports from the UK Parliament have laid out in excruciating detail the ways in 
which social media disinformation is fueling social discord and political divisiveness, 
as well as uninformed or misinformed political thinking.290  The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission has issued a report from its social media 
inquiry describing the ways in which social media platforms are not only spreading 
misinformation, but also driving legitimate news outlets, such as newspapers, with 
a history of employing local journalists, informing the public about local news, and 
carrying out rigorous fact checking – out of business.291   
The societal risks aren’t simply that traditional journalism is, to some extent, 
being displaced by ever-more fringe news outlets offering skewed content on the 
right and the left of the political spectrum.  This trend does, to be sure, accelerate 
the tendency for people to get caught in their own news echo chambers and may 
make critical thinking about controversial or emotionally charged issues more 
difficult.  As troubling as the social and political impacts of those facts might be, the 
more pernicious fact of social media’s role in this shifting journalistic landscape is 
that social media makes it so easy to feed the trolls.  Because social media platforms 
know so much about our individual behavior, interests, personality traits, and 
inclinations, and because of the way that their advertising and engagement models 
work, social media platforms present a nearly-ideal  mechanism for people with a 
message, including people with messages that may be distorted, damaging, false, 
or divisive message.  Social media enables people, companies, and countries to 
individually target their content towards each user of a social media platform, and 
therefore to each prospective voter. A hypothetical example helps illustrate the 
risk: A single Russian troll might target content to me and to my husband on social 
media; however, they will use different content to do it.  Different memes.  
Different invitations to group pages.  Different appeals to our emotions. Different 
advertising.  This is for a simple reason: my husband and I have different personality 
traits and different interests, and the social media platforms make it easy to micro-
target different audiences with different messaging, all designed to have maximum 
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impact on the particular individual who sees the targeted content appear in their 
social media feed.  Although the messaging might be tailored, in the case of foreign 
influence operations, the intended outcomes are almost always the same.  Increase 
citizen dissatisfaction with life in the U.S., sow discord, undermine trust in 
democracy, explicit and exacerbate existing divisions in society, suppress voter 
turnout among key constituencies, and increase the odds that the foreign power’s 
preferred candidate will win.  
Think tanks like the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall 
Fund have pointed to the destabilizing effect across all of the western democracies 
of authoritarian and nationalist movements that are being fueled in part by 
information operations that include these individually-directed and microtargeted 
political messaging.292  Academics like Briony Swire-Thompson at Northeastern 
University and Kathleen Hall Jamison at University of Pennsylvania have done 
extensive research on the phenomena of fake news, Russian troll farms, and 
targeted social media political advertising.293   
Jamieson, a prominent expert in public policy and political communications 
strategies, was one of the first to do comprehensive social science analysis of the 
impact that Russia’s information operations on the 2016 U.S. elections.294  Her 
conclusion: the Russian active measures campaign was powerful and effective in 
shaping U.S. public opinion, and likely changed the outcome of the election in favor 
of Donald Trump.295 Swire-Thompson’s research has a somewhat different focus, 
examining the cognitive mechanisms behind our susceptibility to “fake news.”296 In 
one of her recent papers, she notes that when people are attempting to assess the 
trustworthiness of information, we too often default to cognitive biases like, “they 
might be a liar, but they’re my liar.”297   
In casting about for solutions, some advocates have suggested there should be 
laws requiring greater transparency in social media content, such as that suggested 
under the Honest Ads Act,298 which would require political advertising to carry 
affiliation disclosure statements much like those that are required for political 
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advertising on radio or television.299 Others have correctly pointed out that much 
of the false and misleading content that gets shared does not spread through paid 
advertising, but through inauthentic pages and accounts that misrepresent who the 
user is.300  Many of the observers of this trend have suggested that the answer is to 
pass laws requiring social media platforms to engage in more content moderation, 
flagging bots and trolls, taking down inauthentic accounts, and removing offensive 
content.301  That last prong – deciding when to take down content – runs into 
problems with both the principles of free speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and also with the current statutory framework302 for internet 
regulation, under which platforms aren’t considered publishers of the content 
posted by their users.  Others focus on the need to emphasize critical thinking skills 
in school – but overlook the fact that research has shown that younger people are 
generally more savvy about the need to be skeptical of internet content, and that 
it’s actually older voters who are far more likely to be swayed by slanted content or 
deceived by outright falsehoods when they are posted online.303  According to some 
studies, older Americans are disproportionately likely to share fake news on 
Facebook; no matter what their gender, education level, or frequency of sharing 
activity was, age was more accurate than any other variable in predicting the 
likelihood that a person would share fake news.304  
There are promising examples of how other countries are working to mitigate 
the societal impacts of social media disinformation and other kinds of propaganda 
campaigns being directed at the U.S. by foreign adversaries.305  In the meantime, 
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the 2020 Presidential election season is providing fodder for the debate over 
content moderation and transparency in advertising on social media platforms.  
Facebook continues to battle consumer privacy class action litigation over its 
sharing of detailed personal information of millions of users with political consulting 
firm Cambridge Analytica – perhaps the starkest example to date of personal data 
profiles being used to manipulate political opinion.306  As 2019 was drawing to a 
close, Democratic political candidate Elizabeth Warren posted a deliberately false 
ad on Facebook to illustrate the ways in which Facebook’s advertising policies allow 
political campaigns to direct micro-targeted advertising at potential voters.307  
As the U.S. considers what legislative, regulatory, or other steps might fit within 
the American legal framework, the ways in which the government of Russia has 
leveraged detailed personal profiles as a means to direct political advertising and 
political influence campaigns not only provides evidence of the current risks, but 
suggests the ways in which individual data profiles could be used even more 
aggressively by foreign and domestic actors to influence social issues, election 
outcomes, and other area of public opinion and individual action in the future.  
X. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON DATA-DRIVEN 
TECHNOLOGIES  
Conventional wisdom suggests that law and policy will always struggle to keep pace 
with changes in technology.  That a task may be difficult, however, shouldn’t 
dissuade lawmakers from considering meaningful approaches to tackling the 
problems of balancing the privacy and autonomy interests of individuals with the 
importance of economic growth and corporate innovation.  Not to mention the 
national security need for appropriately constrained government investigation and 
surveillance.   
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Just as has been the case historically, Congress continues to establish new 
committees when circumstances warrant.  And although many issues in Congress 
are so fraught with partisan tension that bipartisan or bicameral agreement can be 
difficult to achieve, American legal, policy, and political discourse on data privacy 
and the uses and impact of personal data have reached a tipping point in which 
bipartisan, bicameral action may be possible.  In the current Congress, committees 
in both the Democrat-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate have 
held hearings on proposals for federal data privacy legislation.  Members of 
Congress in both parties have called for investigations of whether and to what 
extent anti-trust laws should be employed to rein in the growth and power of major 
technology platform providers such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon.308   
Privacy advocacy groups are paying more attention to the ways in which 
personal data can be used to exploit workers in the gig economy,309 and California’s 
recently enacted California Consumer Privacy Act contains provisions which will, 
beginning in January, 2021, grant employees new and expanded rights with respect 
to personal data collected by their employers.310  With attention from advocacy 
groups as well as state legislatures, members of Congress may well find themselves 
facing questions from constituents about whether and how these issues might be 
addressed at the federal level.  Members of both parties have reason to be 
concerned about the extent to which the imbalance between European and 
American approaches to individual data privacy could impede transnational data 
transfer and, with it, American economic growth.  Additionally, members of both 
parties have raised significant concerns about election security and voter 
manipulation.  Several bipartisan bills have been proposed in both chambers that 
would address issues including transparency around micro-targeted political 
advertising, this is advertising which inherently depends on detailed personal 
profiles of the targeted individuals.311  
The recently established House Committee on the Climate Crisis is one example 
of a recently formed Committee designed to address a particular problem set.312  
 
 308. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, New Google and Facebook Inquiries Show Big Tech Scrutiny is Rare Bipartisan Act, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/technology/attorney-generals-tech-
antitrust-investigation.html. 
 309. As noted by one advocacy group, “the so-called “gig economy” has brought to light employers’ 
increasing ability and willingness to monitor employee performance, efficiency, and overall on-the-job conduct. 
Workplace surveillance of gig economy workers often happens without employees’ awareness or consent. This 
is especially evident in the app-based gig economy, where apps act both as an important tool for employees to 
do their job, while also being a means for employers to conduct active surveillance of their workers.” Case 
Study: The Gig Economy and Exploitation, PRIVACY INT’L., https://privacyinternational.org/case-study/751/case-
study-gig-economy-and-exploitation. 
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That Committee, however, is not well-postured for meaningful success.  The 
Committee is comprised of 15 members selected by House leadership; but there is 
no requirement, or even any recommendation, that those members overlap in any 
way with membership of other key committees with jurisdiction over related 
subject matters.313  The committee has no legislative jurisdiction and no authority 
to take legislative action.314  Although the committee’s role is purely investigative, 
it has no subpoena power – it can only recommend subpoenas to other committees 
with authority to issue them315 – and it has no authority to hire its own staff.316  This 
reality severely diminishes the likelihood that the committee will have the services 
of professional staff with expertise in matters relating to climate change available 
to it.  The framework and structure of the House committee on climate change is 
precisely the opposite of what is required to make meaningful progress on a 
complex and far-reaching topic within a short time.  It is un-resourced, 
unempowered, and unable to propose legislative changes; it is, therefore, also 
unlikely to deliver significant progress is helping Congress or the American people 
determine how best to move forward on potential approaches to addressing 
climate change.  That doesn’t make the Committee on climate change irrelevant.  It 
may well conduct hearings that provide meaningful information to the public and 
may well produce reports that provide useful insights and recommendations.  But 
the committee is in no position to drive change. 
The Church and Pike Committees, by contrast, were established with resources, 
subpoena power, intentionally overlapping jurisdiction and expertise, a specific 
mandate to propose and to review legislation, and authority to hire a professional, 
non-partisan staff.  These critically important substantive, procedural, and 
administrative tools were backstopped by a widely shared bipartisan concern over 
the scope of intelligence-gathering activities, particularly as those activities involved 
collecting and retaining information of and about U.S. citizens.  Although members 
of the two major parties then, and now, would draw the line in a slightly different 
place on the balance between individual privacy and security, members of both 
parties, and the bipartisan membership  of the intelligence committees over the 
ensuing years, have unanimously agreed on the importance on both of these values 
that are in tension with each other.  They agree on the importance of preserving 
both security and privacy. 
Thanks in part to the enduring legacy of the Church and Pike Committees, the 
intelligence activities of the U.S. government are subject to regular, rigorous 
oversight.  They are conducted in a fashion that is arguably more transparent than 
any other nation in the world, and with levels of transparency that have generally 
increased over time.  The successor House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
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have continued to oversee intelligence community activities, to propose new 
legislation and to review legislative proposals from other committees.  They serve 
as an important mechanism in ensuring continued effectiveness of national security 
programs as well as continued review of the measures in place to protect the 
privacy of individuals.  The framework established by Church and Pike, while 
imperfect,317 has continued to serve vital interests and important functions.  
A similar bipartisan national sentiment is emerging on the importance of tackling 
the diversity of issues presented by data-driven technologies.  This support makes 
this an appropriate, indeed an auspicious, time to establish bipartisan Select 
Committees on Data Driven Technologies (“DDT”) in the House and Senate that are 
empowered to conduct meaningful, wide-ranging, and well-informed 
investigations, and to propose comprehensive, nuanced, and sensible legislation.  
The key features of such DDT Committees should include the following:  
1) Limited membership, to ensure meaningful participation and discussion.  
Notionally, this could number 15 members in the Senate Committee and 21 
members in the House committee, evenly split between majority and minority, with 
the tie-breaking member being of the majority party.   
2) Intentional overlap of membership with the key committees in each chamber 
already responsible for other aspects of legislative and investigative activity relating 
to data privacy and data-driven technologies.  These would include the Senate 
Committees on Banking, Commerce, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Judiciary.  On 
the House side, these would include the Committees on Education and Labor, 
Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Homeland Security, Intelligence, 
Judiciary, and Space, Science and Technology. Representation should include one 
majority and one minority member from each committee with formally designated 
overlap.   
 
 317. The effectiveness of the intelligence committees, like other Congressional committees, depends in part 
on the temperament and conduct of their leadership, and on a willingness to adhere to important norms that 
are not inherently enforceable via other means.  This dependence was abundantly clear through the conduct 
of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees during the 115th Congress.  During that term, which included 
calendar years 2016-2017, the House Intelligence Committee was chaired by Rep. Devin Nunes, with Ranking 
Member Rep. Adam Schiff.  The Senate Intelligence Committee was chaired by Sen. Richard Burr, with Vice 
Chair Mark Warner.  Both committees conducted investigations into Russian government interference in the 
2016 U.S. Presidential elections.  The House intelligence committee’s investigation was largely viewed as 
compromised by the highly partisan loyalties of HPSCI Chair Nunes, who officially recused himself from the 
investigation during the course of the 115th Congress. See Emmarie Huetteman, Devin Nunes to Step Aside from 
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 APRIL FALCON DOSS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 63 
3) Subpoena power for witnesses and documents, vested in both the Chair and 
Ranking Member or Chair and Vice Chair, depending on terminology adopted by the 
DDT Committees.   
4) Budget allocation for a permanent, professional staff commensurate with the 
scope of the DDT Committees’ activities.  In addition to the usual skill sets of lawyers 
and legislative and policy aides, the Committees should incorporate a Senior 
Technology Advisor or similar role, and should include a number of staff positions 
specifically designated to be filled by individuals with critically-needed technology 
skills, including data science, computer science, cryptomathematics, and similar 
fields.   
5) Authority to propose new legislation and to review the legislative proposals 
of other committees when those proposals include subject matter that falls within 
the new DDT Committees’ jurisdiction.  These new DDT Committees should have a 
defined scope and task that includes a two-year timeline to investigate issues 
relating to data science, privacy, and technology, to make legislative proposals on 
those issues, and to make recommendations on whether there is a need to 
institutionalize their efforts as standing committees in future sessions of Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
The Church Committee report included the following items in its list of chief 
concerns about government surveillance activities: 1) “the number of people 
affected;” 2) “too much information is collected for too long,” 3) “covert action and 
… the use of illegal or improper means,” 4) “ignoring the law,” 5) “deficiencies in 
accountability and control,” 6) the “adverse impact” on individuals of “improper” 
use of data, and 7) “cost and value” of those activities.318  When abstracted from 
the specific context of 1970s oversight of government surveillance activities to the 
larger landscape of modern data-intensive technologies, it becomes clear that these 
seven areas of concern could just as easily describe society’s’ growing sense of 
unease with the ways in which information is collected and used by private sector 
actors in the modern economy.   
Members and committees in both houses of Congress are making laudable 
efforts to explore the many privacy, antitrust, labor and employment, and other 
issues being raised by data-intensive technologies.  But few of these efforts are 
supported by dedicated professional staff with a background in the relevant 
technologies.  Few of them are being carried out with legislative resources – staff, 
committee prominence or influence, budgets – that are commensurate to the 
challenges posed by this large and growing sector of the American economy.  And 
none are taking place within committees that are fully empowered with the full 
scope of jurisdictional reach that could maximize their effectiveness.  The creation 
of new, fully empowered Select Committees on Data-Driven Technologies that are 
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resourced, staffed, and granted sufficient jurisdiction to hold wide-ranging hearings 
and propose cross-functional legislation could have a significant positive impact on 
Congress’s ability to keep pace with the challenges raised by these rapidly evolving 
technologies. 
Although it is unlikely that such new committees would be incorporated into the 
legislative framework during the 116th Congress, this is a move that Congressional 
leadership could and should consider.  If not adopted during the 116th Congress, 
the proposal should be further reviewed and refined for consideration and potential 
adoption by incoming leadership of the 117th Congress in January 2021. 
 
